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In this paper we study the determinants of sovereign debt credit ratings using rating 
notations from the three main international rating agencies, for the period 1995-2005. 
We employ panel estimation and random effects ordered probit approaches to assess the 
explanatory power of several macroeconomic and public governance variables. Our 
results point to a good performance of the estimated models, across agencies and across 
the time dimension, as well as a good overall prediction power. Relevant explanatory 
variables for a country's credit rating are: GDP per capita, GDP growth, government 
debt, government effectiveness indicators, external debt, external reserves, and default 
history.  
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Sovereign credit ratings are a condensed assessment of a government’s ability and 
willingness to repay its public debt both in principal and in interests on time. In this, 
they are forward-looking qualitative measures of the probability of default put forward 
by rating agencies. This paper studies the determinants of sovereign debt credit ratings 
of the three main international rating agencies: Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch 
Ratings. We build an extensive ratings database, with sovereign foreign currency 
ratings, attributed by the three agencies, as well as the credit rating outlook, for a panel 
of 130 countries from 1970 to 2005.  
 
In the first part of the paper we explain the main econometric approaches to the study of 
the determinants of credit ratings focussing on specification of the functional form and 
the estimation methodology. There are two major strands of empirical work in the 
literature: on the one hand, OLS analysis on a numerical representation of the ratings, 
which allows for a straightforward generalization to panel data by doing fixed or 
random effects estimation; on the other hand, ordered response models. We discuss in 
some detail the main advantages and caveat of the several approaches and suggest an 
original specification and a more robust estimation procedure. Our specification allows 
for an important distinction between short and long-run impact of the explanatory 
variables on the credit rating. 
 
In terms of the regressors, we divide them in four main blocks: macroeconomic 
performance (per capita GDP, unemployment rate, inflation rate, real GDP growth), 
government performance block (government debt, fiscal balance and government 
effectiveness), external balance (external debt, foreign reserves and current account 
balance) and other explanatory variables (default history, European Union and regional 
dummies). 
 
The main finding is that GDP per capita, real GDP growth, government debt, 
government effectiveness, external debt and external reserves, sovereign default 
indicator as well as being a member of European Union, are the most important 
determinants of the sovereign debt ratings. We find that the government related 
variables have a stronger effect than found in existing literature. 
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The large sample allows for a sub-period analysis and for a differentiated analysis of 
high and low ratings. While the results are roughly stable across agencies, time periods 
and ratings levels, some additional interesting results emerge. For instance, for the low 
rating levels, external debt and external reserves are more relevant. On the other hand, 
for the early sub-period, 1996-2000, the current account balance was more important, 
while external reserves were possibly somewhat more important in the later period, 
2001-2005 (for Moody’s and S&P). Moreover, after the Asian crisis, it seems there was 
a decline in the relevance of the current account variable in the specifications for 
Moody’s and S&P. 
 
In the last part of the paper we analyse some specific country cases. We find that, for 
instance, Spain’s rating upgrades since 1998 were mainly due to its good 
macroeconomic performance, while Portugal’s deterioration of its creditworthiness 
during the same period can be mainly attributed to poor government performance. 
Additionally new European Union member countries benefited not only from their good 
























Sovereign credit ratings are a condensed assessment of a government’s ability and 
willingness to repay its public debt both in principal and in interests on time. In this, 
they are forward-looking qualitative measures of the probability of default put forward 
by rating agencies. Naturally, one should try to understand the determinants of credit 
ratings, given their relevance for international financial markets, economic agents and 
governments. Indeed, sovereign credit ratings are important in three ways. First, 
sovereign ratings are a key determinant of the interest rates a country faces in the 
international financial market and therefore of its borrowing costs. Second, the 
sovereign rating may have a constraining impact on the ratings assigned to domestic 
banks or companies. Third, some institutional investors have lower bounds for the risk 
they can assume in their investments and they will choose their bond portfolio 
composition taking into account the credit risk perceived via the rating notations. For 
instance, the European Central Bank when conducting open market operations can only 
take as collateral bonds that have at least a single A attributed by at least one of the 
major rating agencies. 
 
In this paper we perform an empirical analysis of foreign currency sovereign debt 
ratings, using rating data from the three main international rating agencies: Fitch 
Ratings, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s. We have compiled a comprehensive data set 
on sovereign debt ratings, macroeconomic data, and qualitative variables for a wide 
range of countries starting in 1990. Regarding the empirical modelling strategy, we 
follow the two main strands in the literature. We make use of linear regression methods 
on a linear transformation of the ratings and we also estimate our specifications under 
an ordered probit response framework.  
 
Our main contribution to the existing literature is the innovation of the estimation 
method used and the functional form specification, and the large dataset employed. 
Under the linear framework, we argue that random effects estimation will be inadequate 
due to the correlation between the country specific error and the regressors, but also that 
its alternative, fixed effects estimation will not be very informative. We salvage the 
random effects approach by means of modelling the country specific error, which in 
practical terms implies adding time-averages of the explanatory variables as additional 
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time-invariant regressors. This setting will allow us to make the constructive distinction 
between immediate and long-run effects of a variable on the sovereign rating. 
Moreover, we also use a limited dependent variable framework by estimating the 
augmented-model using ordered probit and random effects ordered probit specifications. 
The latter is the best procedure for panel data as it considers the existence of an 
additional normally distributed cross-section error. This approach allows both to 
determine the cut-off points throughout the rating scale as well as to test whether a 
linear quantitative transformation of the ratings is actually more appropriate than a 
possible non-linear transformation. Furthermore, we perform robustness check by 
allowing for a sub-period analysis and for a differentiated high and low rating analysis. 
 
We find that in particular six core variables have a consistent impact on sovereign 
ratings. These are the level of GDP per capita, real GDP growth, the public debt level 
and government effectiveness, as well as the level of external debt and external 
reserves. A dummy reflecting past sovereign defaults is also found significant as well 
as, in some cases, the fiscal balance and a dummy for European Union countries. It is 
noteworthy that fiscal variables turn out to be more important than found in the previous 
literature.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section Two we give an overview of the rating 
systems and review the relevant related literature. Section Three explains our 
methodological choices, specifically regarding the econometric approaches employed. 
In Section Four we describe the dataset and report on the empirical analysis, notably in 
terms of the estimation and prediction results. Section Five summarises the paper’s 
main findings. 
 
2. Rating systems and literature 
 
2.1. Overview of rating systems 
 
We use sovereign credit ratings by the three main international rating agencies, 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch Ratings. Although these agencies do not 
use the same qualitative codes, in general, there is a correspondence between each 
agency rating level as shown in Table 1. S&P and Fitch use a similar qualitative letter 
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rating in descending order form AAA to CCC-, while Moody’s system goes from Aaa 
to Caa3. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
2.2. Literature review 
 
Sovereign ratings are assessments of the relative likelihood of default. The rating 
agencies assess the risk of default by analysing a wide range of elements from solvency 
factors that affect the capacity to repay the debt, but also socio-political factors that 
might affect the willingness to pay of the borrower.  For example, S&P determines the 
rating by evaluating the country’s performance in each of the following areas: political 
risk, income and economic structure, economic growth and prospects, fiscal flexibility, 
general government debt burden, off-shore and contingent liabilities, monetary 
flexibility, external liquidity, public-sector external debt burden and private sector 
external debt burden.  
 
Given that the rating materializes out of the analysis of a vast amount of data, it would 
be useful to find a reduced set of variables capable of explaining a country’s rating. A 
first study on the determinants of sovereign ratings by Cantor and Packer (1996) 
concluded that the ratings can be largely explained by a small set of variables namely: 
per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, level of economic 
development, and default history. Further studies incorporated more variables. 
Macroeconomic performance variables like the unemployment rate or the investment-
to-GDP ratio. In papers focussing on the study of currency crises several external 
indicators such as foreign reserves, current account balance, exports or terms of trade 
seem to play an important role. Moreover, indicators of how the government conducts 
its fiscal policy, budget balance and government debt can also be relevant, as well as 
variables that assess political risk, like corruption or social indexes. Table 2 summarises 
some of the relevant related studies and findings. 
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Regarding the econometric approach, there are two major strands in the literature. The 
first uses linear regression methods on a numerical representation of the ratings. The 
early study by Cantor and Packer (1996), applies OLS regressions to a linear 
representation of the ratings, on a cross section of 45 countries. This methodology was 
also pursued by Afonso (2003), Alexe et al. (2003) and Butler and Fauver (2006). Using 
OLS analysis on a numerical representation of the ratings is quite simple and allows for 
a straightforward generalization to panel data by doing fixed or random effects 
estimation (Monfort and Mulder, 2000; Eliasson, 2002 and Canuto et al., 2004).  
 
Although estimating the determinants of ratings using these approaches has in general a 
good fit and a good predictive power it faces some critiques.  As ratings are a qualitative 
ordinal measure, using traditional estimation techniques on a linear representation of the 
ratings is not the most adequate framework of estimation. First, it implies the 
assumption that the difference between two rating categories is equal for any two 
adjacent categories, which would need to be tested. Furthermore, even if this 
assumption was true, because of the presence of elements in the top and bottom 
category, the estimates are biased, even in big samples. Nevertheless, Eliasson (2002) 
argues that given the existence of many categories one can treat the rating variable as 
continuous and to overcome the criticism of the assumption of an even distance between 
steps, it is possible to use different quantitative transformations. For instance, Reisen 
and Maltzan (1999) apply a logistic transformation of the ratings and Afonso (2003) 
applies both a logistic and an exponential transformation of the ratings. In that case, the 
differences between categories are not constant, but are still imposed a priori.  
 
The other strand of the literature uses ordered response models. Because the ratings are 
a qualitative ordinal measure, the established wisdom advises the use of ordered probit 
estimation. This method will itself determine the size of the differences between each 
category. For example, this procedure was used by Hu et al. (2002), Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick (2005) and Bissoondoyal-Bheenick et al. (2005). Although this should be 
considered the preferred estimation procedure it is not entirely satisfying. The crucial 
point is that the ordered probit asymptotic properties do not generalise for a small 
sample, so if we estimate the determinants of the ratings using a cross-section of 
countries, we would have too few observations. It is therefore imperative to try to 
maximize the number of observation by using panel data, but when doing so, one has to 
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be careful. Indeed, the generalization of ordered probit to panel data is not completely 
straightforward, due to the existence of a country specific effect. Furthermore, within 
this framework, the need to have many observations makes it harder to perform 
robustness analysis by, for instance, partitioning the sample. In Section Three we will 




Using a linear scale we grouped the ratings in 17 categories, by putting together in the 
same bucket the few observations below B-. Indeed, if we used a specific number for 
each existing rating notch, for instance 21 categories, it might be hard to efficiently 
estimate the threshold points between CCC+ and CCC, CCC and CCC- and so on, given 
that the bottom rating categories have very few observations. Table 1 above also shows 
the relation established between the qualitative and the possible linear scales. Moreover, 
and as we will see latter in the paper, a linear transformation is quite adherent to the 
data. Nevertheless, we also report in Appendix 3 estimation results using a logistic 
transformation.  
 
3.1. Explanatory variables  
 
Building on the evidence provided by the existing literature, we identify a set of main 
macroeconomic and qualitative variables that may determine sovereign ratings.  
 
GDP per capita – positive impact on rating: more developed economies are expected to 
have more stable institutions to prevent government over-borrowing and to be less 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks. 
 
Real GDP growth – positive impact: higher real growth strengthens the government’s 
ability to repay outstanding obligations. 
 
Inflation – uncertain impact: on the one hand, it reduces the real stock of outstanding 
government debt in domestic currency, leaving overall more resources for the coverage 
of foreign debt obligations. On the other hand, it is symptomatic of problems at the 
macroeconomic policy level, especially if caused by monetary financing of deficits. 
11
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Unemployment – negative impact: a country with lower unemployment tends to have 
more flexible labour markets making it less vulnerable to changes in the economic 
environment. In addition, lower unemployment reduces the fiscal burden of 
unemployment and social benefits while broadening the base for labour taxation.  
 
Government debt – negative impact: a higher stock of outstanding government debt 
implies a higher interest burden and should correspond to a higher risk of default. 
 
Fiscal balance – positive impact: large fiscal deficits absorb domestic savings and also 
suggest macroeconomic disequilibria, negatively affecting the rating level. Persistent 
deficits may signal problems with the institutional environment for policy makers. 
 
Government effectiveness – positive impact: high quality of public service delivery and 
competence of bureaucracy should impinge positively of the ability to service debt 
obligations. (We initially used all six World Bank Governance Indicators: voice and 
accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption 
and government effectiveness, but only this last one turned up as significant). 
 
External debt – negative impact: the higher the overall economy’s external 
indebtedness, the higher becomes the risk for additional fiscal burdens, either directly 
due to a sell-off of foreign government debt or indirectly due to the need to support 
over-indebted domestic borrowers.  
 
Foreign reserves – positive impact: higher (official) foreign reserves should shield the 
government from having to default on its foreign currency obligations. 
 
Current account  balance  – uncertain impact: a higher current account deficit could 
signal an economy’s tendency to over-consume, undermining long-term sustainability. 
Alternatively, it could reflect rapid accumulation of fixed investment, which should lead 
to higher growth and improved sustainability over the medium term.  
 
Default history – negative impact: past sovereign defaults may indicate a great 
acceptance of reducing the outstanding debt burden via a default. The effect is modelled 
12
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by a dummy variable indicating the past occurrence of a default and by a variable 
measuring the number of years since the last default. This variable measures the 
recovery of credibility after a default and can be expected to influence positively the 
rating score. 
 
3.2. Linear regression framework 
 
A possible starting point for our linear panel model would follow Monfort and Mulder 
(2000), Eliasson (2002) or Canuto, Santos and Porto (2004), generalizing a cross section 
specification to panel data, 
 
  it it i i it RXZ a β λ µ =+ + + , (1) 
 
where we have: R – quantitative variable, obtained by a linear or by a non-linear 
transformation; Xit is a vector containing time varying variables that includes the time-
varying explanatory variables described above and Zi  is a vector of time invariant 
variables that include regional dummies. 
 
In (1) the index i (i=1,…,N) denotes the country, the index t (t=1,…,T) indicates the 
period and ai stands for the individual effects for each country i (that can either be 
modelled as a error term or as N dummies to be estimated). Additionally, it is assumed 
that the disturbances µit are independent across countries and across time.  
 
There are three ways to estimate this equation: pooled OLS, fixed effects or random 
effects estimation. In normal conditions all estimators are consistent and the ranking of 
the three methods in terms of efficiency is clear: a random effects approach is preferable 
to the fixed effects, which is preferable to pooled OLS. The question one should ask is 
whether the normal conditions are fulfilled. What we mean by normal conditions is 
whether or not the country specific error is uncorrelated with the regressors E(ai| Xit, 
Zi)=0. If this is the case one should opt for the random effects estimation, while if this 
condition does not hold, both the pooled OLS and the random effects estimation give 
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In our case, it seems more natural that the country specific effect is correlated with the 
regressors.
1 Given this scenario one should be tempted to say that the “fixed effects 
estimation” is the best strategy, but that has a problem. Because there is not much 
variation of a countries rating over time, the country dummies included in the regression 
will capture the country’s average rating, while all the other variables will only capture 
movements in the ratings across time. This means that, although statistically correct, a 
regression by fixed effects would be seriously striped of meaning.  
 
There are two ways of rescuing a random effects approach under correlation between 
the country specific error and the regressors. One is to do the Hausman-Taylor IV 
estimation but for that we would have to come up with possible instruments that are not 
correlated with ai, which does not seem an easy task. In this paper we will opt for a 
different approach that consists on modelling the error term ai. This approach, described 
in Wooldridge (2002), is usually applied when estimating non-linear models, as IV 
estimation proves to be a Herculean task but, as we shall see, the application to our case 
is quite successful. The idea is to give an explicit expression for the correlation between 
the error and the regressors, stating that the expected value of the country specific error 
is a linear combination of time-averages of the regressors i X . This follows Hajivassiliou 
and Ioannides (2006) and Hajivassiliou (2006).  
 
  (|  ,   )  i ii t i E aXZ X η = . (2) 
 
If we modify our initial equation (1), with  t ii aX η ε =+  we get 
 
  i X it it i i it RXZ β λη ε µ =+ + + + , (3) 
 
where i ε  is an error term by definition uncorrelated with the regressors. In practical 
terms, we eliminate the problem by including a time-average of the explanatory 
variables as additional time-invariant regressors.  We can rewrite (3) as: 
 
                                                           
1 This idea can easily be checked by doing some exploratory regressors. We estimated equation (1) using 
random effects and performed the Hausman test; the Qui-Square statistisc was in fact very high, and the 
null hypothesis of no correlation was rejected with p-values of  0.000. 
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  (X ) () X ii it it i i it RX Z β η β λε µ =− + + + + + . (4) 
 
This expression is quite intuitive.δηβ =+can be interpreted as a long-term effect (e. g. 
if a country has a permanent high inflation what is the respective effect on the rating), 
while β is a short-term effect (e. g. if a country manages to reduce inflation this year by 
one point what would be the effect in the rating). This intuitive distinction is useful for 
policy purposes as it can tell what a country can do to improve its rating in the short to 
medium-term. We will estimate equation (4) by random effects, but we also estimate the 
OLS and fixed effects versions. The way we modelled the error term can be considered 
successful if the coefficients of  i X  are significant and if the Hausman test indicates no 
correlation between the regressors and the new error term. 
 
3.3. Ordered response framework 
 
Alternatively we estimate the determinants of sovereign debt ratings in a limited 
dependent variable framework. As we mentioned before, the ordered probit is a natural 
approach for this type of problem, because the rating is a discrete variable and reflects 
an order in terms of probability of default. The setting is the following. Each rating 
agency makes a continuous evaluation of a country’s credit-worthiness, embodied in an 
unobserved latent variable R*. This latent variable has a linear form and depends on the 
same set of variables as before, 
 
 
* (X ) X ii it it i i it RX Z β δλ ε µ =− + + + + . (5) 
 
Because there is a limited number of rating categories, the rating agencies will have 
several cut-off points that draw up the boundaries of each rating category. The final 











 ( )                            
 ( 1)                   
 ( 2)                     





AAA Aaa if R c
AAA a i fcRc
R AAA a i f c R c
CCC Caa if c R
⎧ >












The parameters of equation (5) and (6), notably β, δ, λ and the cut-off points c1 to c16 are 
estimated using maximum likelihood. Since we are working in a panel data setting, the 
generalization of ordered probit is not straightforward, because instead of having one 
error term, we now have two. Wooldridge (2002) describes two approaches to estimate 
this model. One “quick and dirty” possibility is to assume we only have one error term 
that is serially correlated within countries. Under that assumption one can do the normal 
ordered probit estimation but a robust variance-covariance matrix estimator is needed to 
account for the serial correlation. The second possibility is the random effects ordered 
probit model, which considers both errors εi and µit to be normally distributed, and the 
maximization of the log-likelihood is done accordingly. This second approach should be 
considered the best one, but it has as a drawback the quite cumbersome calculations 
involved. In STATA this procedure was created by Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2000) and 
substantially improved by Frechette (2001a, 2001b), and we will use such procedures in 
our calculations. 
 




We build a ratings database with sovereign foreign currency rating attributed by the 
three above-mentioned main rating agencies. For the rating notations we covered a 
period from 1970 to 2005. The rating of a particular year is the rating that was attributed 
at 31
st of December of that year. In 2005 there are 130 countries with a rating, though 




In Figure 1 we can see the evolution of the number of countries rated by each agency 
and it is possible to notice a significant increase in mid 1990’s of the number of 
countries with rating, especially from S&P and Moody’s.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
                                                           
2 The full historical rating dataset that we compiled, including foreign and local currency ratings as well 
as credit rating outlooks, is available from the authors on request. 
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In general the ratings attributed by the three agencies are quite similar. As shown in 
Table 3 around 50 per cent of all observations have the same pair-wise rating. It is also 
interesting to notice that S&P and Fitch have much closer ratings, and Moody’s is more 
divergent with a significant number of observations having a distance of two notches 
vis-à-vis the other two agencies. This might indicate, for instance, that Moody’s and 
S&P give different weights to different indicators or simply reflects the uncertainty in 
measuring the default risk.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
For the present study we limited the sample to 1995-2005 because of data availability of 
explanatory variables. The variables inflation, unemployment, GDP growth, fiscal 
balance and current account entered as a 3 years average, reflecting the agencies’ 
approach to take out the effect of the business cycle when deciding on a sovereign 
rating. The external debt variable was taken from the World Bank and is only available 
for non-industrial countries, so for industrial countries it was attributed the value 0, 
which is equivalent to having a multiplicative dummy. As for the dummy variable for 
European Union, we consider that the rating agencies anticipated the EU accession. 
Thus we tested the contemporaneous variable as well as up to three leads. We find that 
for Moody’s and S&P the variable enters with two leads, while for Fitch we find no 
anticipation of EU accession. (See Appendix 1 for a full list of variables used in the 
estimations as well as their specification and data sources.) 
  
Regarding the estimation procedure, starting out with the broadest possible set of 
variables, we sequentially dropped those that did not reveal any explicative power 
(export growth, investment, trade openness, domestic credit growth, interest payments 
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4.2. Linear panel results 
 
4.2.1. Full sample 
 
The results generated by the panel regressions point to broadly similar regression 
models across the three rating agencies (see Tables 4, 5 and 6). In view of the analytical 
considerations above the discussion will focus on the random effects estimations. This 
is supported by the Hausmann tests reported at the end of each table pointing to the 
acceptability of the random effects approach. Nevertheless, we also report the pooled 
OLS and the fixed effects results for completeness and comparison purposes. 
 
[Insert Tables 4, 5 and 6 here] 
 
We report the results of two models for each of the rating agencies, the unrestricted and 
the restricted model. While the unrestricted model incorporates all variables discussed 
above, the restricted model contains only the variables which were found to have a 
statistically significant impact. Although the sequence of excluding individual variables 
in moving from the unrestricted to the restricted regression can have an impact on the 
final specfication, the restricted models presented in the tables are quite robust to 
alternative exclusion procedures. As can be seen from the statistics reported at the end 
of each table, the explanatory power of the models is very high with R-square values 
around 95 per cent and it remains almost constant moving from the unrestricted to the 
restricted versions, while the number of observations increases marginally. In addition, 
the variables found to be significant in the unrestricted model generally remain 
significant with the same sign in the restricted version.  
 
The restricted models reveal a homogenous set of explanatory variables across agencies. 
On the real side, GDP per capita and GDP growth rates turn out significant for all three 
companies. In the fiscal area, this applies to the government debt ratio as a difference 
from the average and to the government effectiveness indicator. On the external side, 
the average external debt ratio and the average level of reserves are found to be 
significant across agencies. Default, EU and industrial country dummies are also 
significant for all agencies. Moreover, the size of the coefficients is of the same order of 
magnitude and they have the expected signs. In particular, the level and growth rate of 
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real income drive up the rating, government and external debt have a negative impact 
and government effectiveness and higher external reserves have a positive impact. 
 
Beyond this set of core variables, the agencies appear to employ a limited number of 
additional variables. For Fitch the analysis finds the smallest set of additional variables, 
comprising government effectiveness as a deviation from the average and foreign 
currency reserves also as the short-run deviation. By contrast, the analysis finds more 
significant explanatory variables for Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, with a large 
degree of homogeneity between these two agencies. In particular, on the real side 
inflation is found to have a significantly negative impact. In the fiscal area, the average 
debt level exerts an additional negative impact on the ratings level, whereas the fiscal 
balance has a strong positive impact. With regard to the external sector, the current 
account balance has a negative impact.  
 
The findings regarding the current account effect may appear surprising as it suggests 
that countries with high current account surpluses would tend to be rated lower than 
otherwise equal countries without such surpluses. However, this result is quite recurrent 
in the literature (Monfort and Mulder, 2000 or Eliasson, 2002). A possible explanation 
is that a current account deficit could in fact serve as an indicator for the willingness of 
foreigners to cover the current account gap through loans and foreign investment. In this 
situation, a higher current account deficit would be associated with either higher credit-
worthiness or good economic prospects of the economy and consequently a higher 
sovereign rating.  
 
Finally, the impact of the unemployment variables appears not entirely clear cut. While 
the average level of unemployment is found to have a significant negative impact on the 
rating by Moody’s, the short-run deviation from the average enters positively and 
significantly in the S&P model. Structural reforms that raise unemployment in the short 
run but improve fiscal sustainability in the long run could provide an explanation for 
this latter finding, but further research would be necessary to validate this hypothesis.  
 
One can also assess how successfull and important our specification is. First, most of 
the time averages of the explanatory variables are significant, which proves that if we 
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did not include them we would be mispecifying the model.
3 Second, the models pass the 
Hausman test, which sugested that the problem was entirely corrected. Furthermore, if 
we look at the fixed effects estimation we can see how poor it is. Notice the estimated 
constant and its significance. In general the constant captures the middle rating, while 
the estimated country dummies (ommited here), which vary from -7 to 7 notches, 
capture each country’s average rating. All the other variables only capture small 
movements from the rating in relation to its average
4. 
 
4.2.2. Differentiation across sub-periods 
 
The separation of the overall sample into two sub-periods allows to assess broadly the 
robustness of the empirical models and provides additional insight into possible changes 
in the rating determinants. In particular, cutting the sample period in 2000 could reveal 
any changes in the sovereign ratings methodology in response to the Asian crisis which 
was perceived by market participants as revealing previously underestimated risks to 
sovereign sustainability. Additionally, this also divides the full sample in two rather 
similar sized sub-samples. 
 
The models for the sub-periods are generally in line with those for the full estimation 
period, although the significance levels of the individual coefficients are reduced (see 
Tables 7–9). The lower significance levels reflect the reduction in the respective sample 
sizes in half, which makes the coefficient estimates less certain. Taking this into 
account, signs and orders of magnitude of the coefficient estimates from the full-period 
models are mostly confirmed for the sub-periods. In particular, the core variables 
identified above enter the models for the sub-periods with the correct sign and generally 
significantly with a comparable order of magnitude.  
 
[Insert Tables 7, 8 and 9 here] 
 
Regarding the possible impact of the Asian crisis on ratings approaches, the stability of 
the ratings models suggests that there was no fundamental change in methodologies. A 
                                                           
3 This is in fact the cause why without including time-averages the models would not pass the Hausman 
test. 
4 We also estimated the model with the average rating of the three agencies, and also pooling the data for 
the three agencies, but the results where quite similar.  
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change that may point to some adaptation of ratings methods in response to the Asian 
events is the decline in importance of the current account variable for Moody’s and 
S&P, both with regard to the value of the estimated coefficient as well as its 
significance level. The change may suggest that the function of the current account as 
an indicator for foreigners’ willingness to cover the current account gap has declined. 
Finally, for Moody’s the increase in value and significance of the coefficient on external 
reserves may point to a higher importance attached to this variable after the Asian crisis. 
Taken together with the reduced importance of the current account, this could suggest a 
move towards a broader view on foreign financial relationships, which includes capital 
flows in addition to the current account movements. 
 
Looking at the individual agencies, for Fitch coefficient values remain remarkably 
stable over the sub-periods. An exception is the negative (though insignificant) value for 
GDP growth in the early sub-sample. For S&P, sign reversals between sub-periods 
occur for the explanatory variables unemployment, government effectiveness and 
external debt, but there are no significant coefficient estimates with opposing signs. For 
Moody’s, the models point to a sign reversal for the insignificant estimate of the 
coefficient on inflation. 
 
4.2.3. Differentiation across ratings levels 
 
As a further test of the robustness of the results derived above, the sample was split into 
two groups according to the ratings level: regressions were run separately for high-rated 
countries with grades BBB+ and below and those above this grade. The choice of the 
threshold reflects practical considerations. While market participants generally divide 
bond issuers into investment-grade and non-investment grade at the threshold of BBB-, 
this threshold would result in a relatively small number of observations for low ratings 
making inference problematic. From the estimation of the ratigns above BBB+, we 
removed the variable external debt because there were too few observations of non-
industrial countries. 
 
The results for the separate regressions according to ratings levels confirm the overall 
results from the full sample (see Tables 10–12). Looking at the random effects 
estimation for each agency, the variables that were found to be significant across 
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agencies in the  full sample also show up consistently with the correct sign in the 
individual regression models for high and low ratings. Most of the coefficients are 
statistically significant. Notably, the importance of average external reserves appears to 
rise for low ratings in the models for Fitch and S&P. In the cases of statistical 
significance external reserves always have a positive impact on the ratings. 
 
[Insert Tables 10, 11 and 12 here] 
 
The explanatory power of the individual regressions is somewhat lower than that found 
for the full sample as well as for the sub-periods. This reflects the fact that splitting the 
sample in this way reduces the number of rating categories for each estimation, so that, 
with a discrete dependent variable, estimated rating errors become relatively larger.  
 
Beyond the core variables, the results for Moody’s and S&P suggest a significant 
difference in the importance of inflation for high and low ratings, respectively. For both 
agencies the (significant) coefficient on inflation as an average and the deviation from it 
is much higher for high ratings than for low ratings. (For Fitch, this finding is supported 
by the pooled OLS and the fixed effects estimations, but not for the random effects 
specification.) This suggests that for high rated countries inflation has a much more 
important impact on the rating. A possible explanation is that for this set of countries 
price level stability may be taken as an indicator for sound economic and in particular 
monetary policies which support the long-run sustainability of government finances.  
 
Turning to differences across agencies, the results point to a relatively high level of 
consistency in the approach to high and low ratings for Fitch and Moody’s. For these 
two agencies signs and (mostly) significance levels of coefficient are generally 
consistent for high and low ratings. A somewhat higher degree of variation in this 
regard can be observed for S&P where the sign of the estimated impact of some 
variables switches between high and low ratings, although in most instances the 
comparison involves statistically insignificant coefficients. Additionally, one notices 
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4.3. Ordered probit results  
 
In view of the discussion of econometric issues above, ordered probit models should 
give additional insight into the determinants of sovereign ratings. In particular, this 
method allows to relax the rigid assumption on the shape of the ratings schedule. 
Instead it generates estimates of the threshold values between rating notches allowing an 
assessment of the shape of the ratings curve. Given the data requirements, the method 
was only applied to the full sample, which appears appropriate in view of the overall 
robustness of the empirical results to the use of sub-samples.  
 
The results from the ordered probit estimation validate the findings highlighted above 
(see Tables 13 and 14, respectively for the ordered probit robust standard errors and the 
random effects ordered probit). The core variables identified in the linear regressions 
also show up with the correct sign in the ordered probit approach. In addition, the 
ordered probit models suggest the significance of somewhat more explanatory variables, 
namely inflation and the current account, which were significant only in some 
specifications in the linear approach. At the same time, in the area of external variables, 
reserves do not show up significantly for Moody’s and Fitch in the restricted 
specifications, both for the ordered probit and for the random effects ordered probit. 
Finally, for the current account variable, the restricted specification for Moody’s shows 
a negative sign for deviations from the long-term average, but a positive sign for the 
average, and similar sign switches appear also in some instances for the other agencies. 
This result goes some way in reconciling the counter intuitive result of the negative 
effect of current account on sovereign ratings, with the conventional wisdom. 
 
[Insert Tables 13 and 14 here] 
 
The estimated threshold coefficients reported in the second part of the tables suggest 
that the linear specification assumed for the panel regression above is appropriate. The 
plot of the results of the random effects ordered probit (see Figure 2), shows that for all 
three agencies the thresholds between rating notches are broadly equally distributed 
across the ratings range. In other words, the distance for a country to move e.g. from B– 
to B is roughly equal to that for moving from AA to AA+. Nevertheless, the 
econometric tests at the bottom of the tables reveal additional insights. For the restricted 
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model of Moody’s, the test does not reject the null hypothesis of equal distances 
between thresholds, but the significance level is close to 10 per cent. Indeed the 
estimated thresholds point to a relatively large jump between the ratings for BBB– and 
BBB. This suggests that countries close to the non-investment grade rating are given a 
wider range before they actually cross that threshold. For Fitch, the hypothesis of equal 
distances is strongly rejected as the thresholds for higher ratings are further apart than 
those of the lower ratings. In this case the kink lies at the A rating.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Finally, for S&P, different distances are found throughout the ratings scale. Looking at 
Figure 2, it appears that for lower ratings the relative distance between thresholds of 
S&P coincides with that of Moody’s. However, above the investment grade limit, the 
distances between thresholds at first decline and then increase, resulting in a slightly 
curved ratings schedule that makes the transition to the highest grades most difficult. 
 
4.4. Prediction analysis 
 
Our prediction analysis will focus on two elements: the prediction for the rating of each 
individual observation in the sample, as well as the prediction of movements in the 
ratings through time. 
 
Prediction with the pooled OLS model was done by rounding the fitted value (which is 
continuous) to the closest integer between 1 and 17. For the random effects estimations 
we can have two predictions, with or without the country specific effect, εi, and we can 
write the corresponding estimated versions of (4) as: 
 
  ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (X ) X ii it it i i RX Z β δλ ε =− + + + , (7a) 
 
  ˆˆ ˆ (X ) X ii it it i R XZ β δλ =− + + % . (7b) 
 
We can then estimate each country specific effect by taking the time average of the 
estimated residual for each country. As a result we can include or exclude this 
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additional information that comes out of the estimation. In other words, we generate in-
sample and out-of-sample prediction. After the fitted value is computed it is then also 
rounded to the closest integer between 1 and 17. The prediction with both ordered probit 
and the random effects ordered probit was done by fitting the value of the latent 
variable, setting the error term to zero, and then match it up to the cut points do 
determine the predicted rating. Table 15 presents an overall summary of the prediction 
errors, for the three agencies and for the several methods using the respective restricted 
specifications. 
 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
 
The first conclusion is that the random effects model including the estimated country 
effect is the method with the best fit. On average for the three agencies, it correctly 
predicts 70 per cent of all observations and more than 95 per cent of the predicted 
ratings lie within one notch (99 per cent within two notches). This is not surprising, the 
country errors capture factors like political risk, geopolitical uncertainty and social 
tensions that are likely to systematically affect the ratings, therefore, such term acts like 
a correction for these factors. 
 
This additional information cropping up from the random effects estimation with the 
country specific effect can be very useful if we want to work with countries that belong 
to our sample. But if we want to make out of sample predictions we will not have this 
information. In that case, only the random effects estimation excluding the country error 
is comparable to the OLS specification, to the ordered probit and to the random effects 
ordered probit. We can see that in general both ordered probit and random effects 
ordered probit have a better fit than the pooled OLS and random effects for all three 
agencies, though not as clearly for Fitch. Overall, the simple ordered probit seems the 
best method as far as prediction in levels is concerned as it predicts correctly around 45 
per cent of all observations and more then 80 per cent within one notch.  
 
Another interesting aspect to notice is that the OLS and the random effects 
specifications are biased downward, while the ordered probit and random effects 
ordered probit ones are slightly biased upward. The explanation for this turns out to be 
simple if we look at Figures 3 to 5, were we present a map of predicted versus actual 
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rating for every category using the four estimation methods. We can see that both the 
OLS and the random effects specifications tend to under predict actual AAA’s (Aaa) 
while both ordered probit models and random effects ordered probit tend to over predict 
the actual rating in the top categories, attributing many AAA’s (Aaa) to countries with 
actual lower rating. In the bottom end of the rating scale the opposite happens, OLS and 
random effects have a propensity to overestimate ratings that are bellow CCC+ (Caa1), 
on the other hand, both ordered probit prediction errors are quite balanced. 
 
[Insert Figures 3, 4 and 5 here] 
 
Those figures provide some additional insights. For Moody’s, ordered probit performs 
well in the bottom ratings while random effects ordered probit is better for top ratings. 
Also notice that all four models have difficulty explaining the rating A3. Out of 21 
observations the maximum correctly predicted is 2 (with OLS) with a substantial 
number of predictions lying outside 1 notch.  
 
For S&P the ordered probit outperforms all other models in the middle and bottom 
categories. For Fitch, one should mention that the number of observations used for the 
random effects ordered probit is higher than the other models (because of the non-
inclusion of one of the variables), which makes comparison harder. One element we 
need to highlight is the fact that there is only one observation in the category A+, which 
is the possible cause for the identification of the jump in both limited dependent 
variable estimations, mentioned before in section 4.4. For completeness, Figure 6 
reports the map of predicted ratings using the random effects estimation including 
country specific errors. 
 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
 
Let’s now turn to how the models perform in predicting changes in ratings. Table 16 
presents the total number of sample upgrades (downgrades), the predicted number of 
upgrades (downgrades) and the number of upgrades (downgrades) that where correctly 
predicted by the several models. 
 
[Insert Table 16 here] 
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Roughly the models correctly predict between one third and one half of both upgrades 
and downgrades. In our opinion this is quite satisfactory given that the empirical 
approach used here necessarily neglects two sources of information that are known to 
enter the decision of the rating agencies. First, in contrast to the backward-looking 
models presented above, rating agencies base their decision to a considerable extent on 
projected economic developments. Thus, a full empirical model of the agencies’ 
approach would need to incorporate the agencies’ expectations regarding the relevant 
explanatory variables. However, as the agencies generally do not publish their 
projections, any such modelling attempt would remain highly tentative. Still, the 
observation that many of the actual rating changes are predicted by the models with a 
lag of one or two years appears to support the relevance of this point. Second, ratings 
agencies also generally make a clear point that they cover qualitative variables in 
addition to quantitative data in the ratings process. While the relative importance of the 
qualitative and quantitative factors that enter the ratings decision is uncertain (and might 
well vary across countries), rating agencies’ public statements indicate that such factors 
can play an important role.
5 In the models above, by contrast, the only variable 
reflecting such considerations is the government effectiveness indicator and it thus 
appears likely that in these models the impact of qualitative factors is under-represented.  
 
The most noticeable difference between the models is not the number of corrected 
predicted changes but the total number of predicted changes. In fact, the ordered probit 
and random effects ordered probit predict significantly more changes than the OLS and 
random effects counterparts. For instance, for S&P, while both OLS and random effects 
predict around 79 upgrades and 50 downgrades, the ordered probit model predicts 102 
upgrades and 64 downgrades. 
 
4.5. Examples of specific country analysis 
 
In terms of the magnitude of the coefficients, the comparison between the ordered probit 
and random effects ordered probit is not straightforward because the estimated distances 
between the categories are different. But in general, once this is accounted for, by 
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standardising the coefficients in relation to the average jump, they are both in line with 
the linear panel results. An improvement of 2 percentage points in the budget deficit, a 
reduction of 5 percentage points in public debt, or a higher GDP growth by 3 percentage 
points, all have the same relative impact on the ratings between 0.1 and 0.2 notches. An 
increase of 10 per cent in GDP per capita would improve the rating by 0.15 to 0.25 
notches. As we mentioned, a reduction of the unemployment only affects the rating if 
this reduction is sustainable. If that is the case, a reduction of 4 percentage points 
increases the rating by 0.2 to 0.35 notches. The effect of inflation is quite small, a 
reduction of 20 percentage points on inflation increases the rating by 0.05 to 0.1 
notches. These values are too small to be noteworthy for industrial countries, but if one 
does the same calculation with the value estimated for high rated countries a reduction 
of 4 percentage points in inflation would increase the rating by 0.15 notches.  
 
Now that we have an idea of the estimated impact of the variables we can do some 
specific country analysis. As an example, in Table 17 we show the rating for some 
European countries and some emerging markets both in 1998 and 2005. Then, we use 
the estimated short-run coefficients of the random effects ordered probit together with 
the values for the relevant variables. Afterwards, we divide the overall prediction 
change in the rating for each agency into the contributions of the different blocks of 
explanatory variables: macroeconomic performance, government and fiscal 
performance, external elements and European Union
6. The upper and lower bound 
presented are computed by adding and subtracting one standard deviation to the point 
estimate of the coefficients. 
 
[Insert Table 17 here] 
 
Let’s compare, for instance, Portugal and Spain. In 1998 they both had an AA (Aa2) 
rating but in 2005 while Spain had been upgraded to AAA (Aaa) by all agencies, 
Portugal had been downgraded by S&P. If we analyse the contributions of the main key 
variables we see that, for Portugal the positive contribution of the macroeconomic 
performance was overshadowed by the negative government developments. For such 
                                                           
6 As an exception, we used the long-run coefficient of unemployment instead of the short-run coefficient. 




Working Paper Series No 711
January 2007 
 
government performance contributed the worsening of the budget deficit since 2000, the 
upward trend in government debt and the worsening in the World Bank governance 
effectiveness indicator. As for Spain, the good macroeconomic performance was the 
main cause of the upgrade, specially the reduction of structural unemployment since the 
mid nineties and the increase of GDP per capita due to the persistent high growth.  
 
Another example can be seen with the new European Union member states Slovakia, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Poland, which have in general been 
upgraded by the three agencies, in some cases more than two notches. The good 
macroeconomic performance, especially in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, plays a 
major role, but there was also an important credibility effect of joining the European 
Union, mostly visible for Moody’s. It is in fact for Moody’s that we observe the 
strongest upgrades. For Poland, the effect of the macro performance might be 
undervalued. One of the key elements was the sharp reduction of inflation of more then 
12 percentage points, but, as we mentioned before, the effect of inflation for high rated 
countries is under assessed in the main estimations. If we consider such information, 
one would have an estimated additional impact of almost half a notch. 
 
As a final example for the emerging economies, we report the results for five countries 
that have, in general also been upgraded: Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand and South 
Africa. We should briefly highlight that for Brazil the main positive contribution came 
from the external area specially the reduction of external debt and the increase in 
foreign reserves. This effect is particular to Fitch. For Malaysia and Thailand the main 
contribution came from the macro side, while for Mexico and South Africa the 




In this paper we studied the determinants of global sovereign debt ratings using ratings 
from the three main international rating agencies, for the period 1995-2005. Overall, our 
results point to a good performance of the estimated models, across agencies and across 
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Regarding the methodological approach, we used both a linear framework and an 
ordered probit approach. We modelled the country specific error using a random effects 
approach, which in practical terms implied adding time-averages of the explanatory 
variables as additional time-invariant regressors. This setting allowed us to distinguish 
between immediate and long-run effects of a variable on the sovereign rating level. 
Moreover, we also used a limited dependent variable framework by means of an ordered 
probit and random effects ordered probit specifications. The latter is the best procedure 
for panel data as it considers the existence of an additional normally distributed cross-
section error term. This approach allowed both to determine the cut-off points 
throughout the rating scale as well as assessing whether a linear quantitative 
transformation of the ratings is actually more appropriate than a possible non-linear 
transformation.  
 
Our main findings in the panel random effects framework allowed us to detect a set of 
core variables that are relevant for the determination of the ratings: per capita GDP; 
GDP real growth rate; government debt; government effectiveness; external debt and 
external reserves; sovereign default indicators. Moreover, the importance of fiscal 
variables appears stronger than in the previous existing literature.
7  
 
The ordered probit analysis confirmed the overall estimation results from the linear 
panel regressions. Interestingly, there is some evidence for different approaches of the 
agencies with regard to the distance between ratings thresholds. For instance, for 
Moody’s the estimated thresholds point to a relatively large jump between the ratings 
for BBB– and BBB. This suggests that countries close to the non-investment grade 
rating are given a wider range before they actually cross that threshold. For Fitch, the 
hypothesis of equal distances is strongly rejected as the thresholds for higher ratings are 
further apart than those of the lower ratings. In this case the kink lies at the A rating. On 
the other hand, no clear switching pattern emerges for S&P.  
 
The panel sample we used is quite comprehensive, which allowed for a sub-period 
analysis and for a differentiated high and low rating analysis. While the results are 
                                                           
7 We performed additional analysis from some different perspectives. For instance, we used the 
information on credit rating outlooks but no relevant improvement on the fit of the models occurred. In 
addition, we assessed also whether different exchange rate regimes added information to the rating 
determination, but that was not the case. 
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roughly stable across agencies, time periods and ratings levels, some additional 
interesting results emerge. For instance, for the low rating levels, external debt and 
external reserves are more relevant. On the other hand, for the early sub-period, 1996-
2000, the current account balance was more important, while external reserves were 
possibly somewhat more important in the later period, 2001-2005 (for Moody’s and 
S&P). Moreover, after the Asian crisis, it seems there was a decline in the relevance of 
the current account variable in the specifications for Moody’s and S&P. 
 
Another relevant outcome ot the analysis ist that low ratings levels are more affected by 
external debt and external reserves while inflation plays a bigger role for high rating 
levels. On the other hand, the specifications for the Fitch ratings seem to be most 
consistent over time and ratings categories. There was more variation for S&P and 
Moody’s in the middle of the rating scales, which possibly points to a more quantitative 
model-based approach for Fitch. 
 
Finally, regarding the prediction analysis, the random effects model including the 
estimated country effect turns out to be the method with the best fit. On average for the 
three agencies, such specification correctly predicted 70 per cent of all observations and 
more than 95 per cent of the predicted ratings lay within one notch. Moreover, the 
models also correctly predicted between one third and one half of respectively upgrades 
and downgrades. This is quite satisfactory for two reasons: first, the rating agencies also 
have a forward looking behaviour that is absent from our models and second, other 
qualitative factors not captured in our variables may play an important role. 
 
Looking forward, further studies could investigate how to capture agencies’ 
expectations in empirical models as well as their views on qualitative variables. 
Moreover, in our modelling approach we only use the government effectiveness 
indicator in order to asses the impact of qualitative factors on the rating determination. 
Therefore, other qualitative information could also be tentatively assessed as for 
instance, socio-political factors. 
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Tables and figures 
 




Characterization of debt and 
issuer (source: Moody’s) 
 
S&P  Moody’s   Fitch  Scale 21  Scale 17 
Highest  quality  AAA Aaa AAA  21 17 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 20 16 
AA Aa2 AA 19 15  High quality 
AA- Aa3 AA- 18 14 
A+ A1 A+  17 13 
A A2 A  16 12  Strong payment capacity 
A- A3 A-  15 11 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 14 10 










BBB- Baa3 BBB- 12 8 
BB+ Ba1 BB+  11 7 
BB Ba2 BB  10 6  Likely to fulfil obligations, 
ongoing uncertainty 
BB- Ba3 BB- 9 5 
B+ B1 B+ 8 4 
B B2 B 7 3  High credit risk 
B- B3 B- 6 2 
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+  5 
CCC Caa2 CCC  4  Very high credit risk 
CCC- Caa3 CCC-  3 
CC Ca CC  Near default with possibility 
of recovery     C 
 
2 
SD C  DDD 
D   DD  Default 
Spec
ulative grade 




































Table 2 – Some previous related studies 
 
Reference Data  Explanatory  variables  Agencies Methodology 






Per capita GDP, GDP growth, Inflation, current account 
surplus, government budget surplus, debt-to-exports, 




Linear transformation of the 
data. OLS estimation. 









Debt-to-GDP, debt-to-exports, debt service-to-exports, debt 
reschedule, reserves, current account surplus, real effective 
exchange rate, export growth, short-term debt share, terms 
of trade, inflation, growth of domestic credit, GDP growth, 
government budget surplus, investment-to-GDP ratio, per 






Linear transformation of the 
data. Two specifications: 
static (OLS estimation of the 
pooled data) and dynamic 
(error correction specification 
including as regressor the 
previous rating and several 






Per capital GDP, GDP growth, inflation, debt-to-exports 
ratio, government budget surplus, short-term debt to foreign 
reserves ratio, export growth, interest rate spread 
S&P 
Linear transformation of the 
data. Static specification and 
both fixed and random effects 
estimation. Dynamic 
specification. 





12 to 92 
countries 
Debt service-to-exports ratio, debt-to-GNP ratio, reserves to 
debt, reserves to imports, GNP growth, inflation, default 
history, default in previous year, regional dummies, non-
industrial countries dummy 
S&P 
Ordered probit on pooled 






Per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, current account 
surplus, government budget surplus, debt-to-exports ratio, 
economic development, default history 
S&P 
Moody′s 
Linear, logistic and 
exponential transformation of 
the data. OLS estimation. 






Per capita GDP, inflation, trade balance, export growth, 
reserves, government budget surplus, debt-to-GDP ratio, 
exchange rate, domestic credit-to-GDP ratio, government 
effectiveness, corruption index, political stability 
S&P  Linear transformation and 
OLS estimation. 
Canuto, Santos 





Per capita GDP, GDP growth, inflation, government debt to 
receipts, government budget surplus, trade to GDP, debt-to-






Linear transformation. OLS, 
fixed effects and first 
differences estimation. 





Per capita GDP, GDP growth, inflation, corruption 
perception index, political risk index, years since default,  
frequency of high inflation periods, government debt-to-
GDP ratio, debt-to-exports ratio, others 
S&P 
Moody′s 
Linear transformation of data. 
OLS regression of average 
credit rating including year 
dummies as regressors. 
Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick, Brooks 






GDP, inflation, foreign direct investment to GDP, current 














Per capita GDP, inflation, govt financial balance to GDP,  
government debt-to-GDP ratio, real effective exchange rate, 
export to GDP, reserves, unemployment rate, unit labour 




Estimate an ordered probit 
using two scales 1-21 and 1-9 
for each year individually. 






Per capita income, debt-to-GDP ratio, inflation, 
underdevelopment index, legal environment index, legal 
origin dummies 
Institutional 
Investor  OLS estimation. 
 
Note: Additional related studies from the rating agencies are provided by S&P (2004, 2006), Fitch (2006) 
























6 0  1  0 
5 0  1  3 
4 1  0  7 
3 3  1  12 
2 61  13  60 
1 202  128  114 
0 518  487  370 
-1 161  135  123 
-2 67  21  46 
-3 13  4 6 
-4 9  0  0 
-5 2  0  0 
-6 0  0  0 
Total  1037 791  741 
Within 1 *  85.0%  94.8%  81.9% 
Within 2 **  97.3%  99.1%  96.2% 
 
Notes: * – % of differences in notches within +/- 1 notch. 
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Table 4 – Estimations for Moody’s 
  Pooled OLS  Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 3.618***  3.934*** 3.431  8.291  10.064***  9.952 
  (2.85)  (3.22)  (0.95) (12.49)  (99.36) (143.93) 
GDP per capita  1.686***  1.607***  1.779***  1.789*** 1.800***  1.876 
  (5.07)  (4.91) (7.61) (8.03)  (7.53) (9.61) 
GDP per capita Avg.  0.664***  0.631***  0.650       
  (4.11)  (3.92) (1.46)       
GDP growth  7.431***  9.044***  8.643***  8.768*** 8.971***  5.909 
  (2.04)  (2.76) (3.07) (3.26) (3.14) (2.44) 
GDP growth  Avg.  0.527    5.237       
  (0.12)   (0.46)      
Unemployment -0.044  -0.069**  0.014   0.024   
  (-1.43)  (-2.34) (0.52)    (0.87)  
Unemployment Avg.  -0.049***  -0.051***  -0.072*  -0.073*    
  (-3.68)  (-3.67) (-1.78) (-1.70)     
Inflation -0.452***  -0.497***  -0.124*  -0.145** -0.105**  -0.136 
  (-2.64)  (-2.95) (-1.79) (-2.11) (-2.01) (-2.66) 
Inflation Avg.  -0.648***  -0.712****  -0.360*  -0.347**    
  (-3.55)  (-4.05) (-1.84) (-2.00)     
Gov Debt  -0.008  -0.014**  -0.014**  -0.014** -0.016***  -0.015 
  (-1.21)  (-2.40) (-2.38) (-2.53) (-2.65)  (-3.54) 
Gov Debt Avg.  -0.013***  -0.016***  -0.011  -0.014**    
  (-4.12)  (-4.81) (-1.49) (-2.24)    
Gov Balance  6.995*    7.740*** 6.991*** 7.598***  6.056 
  (1.94)   (2.77)  (2.54)  (2.58)  (2.99) 
Gov Balance Avg.  6.311*  6.122*  7.893     
  (1.80)  (1.67)  (0.80)     
Gov Effectiveness  0.277   0.242  0.205  0.542 
  (0.88)    (1.18)    (0.98)  (2.90) 
Gov Effectiveness Avg.  1.927***  1.756*** 1.906*** 2.470***     
  (10.89)  (9.78)  (4.06) (6.80)    
External Debt  -0.010***  -0.009*** -0.004*  -0.004*  -0.003   
  (-5.84)  (-5.60)  (-1.79) (-1.95)  (-1.27)   
External Debt Avg.  -0.007***  -0.006*** -0.004**  -0.004**     
  (-6.54)  (-5.82)  (-2.20) (-2.47)    
Current Account  -8.334***  -8.881***  -7.246***  -8.760*** -7.074***  -2.605 
  (-3.84)  (-4.27) (-3.67) (-4.84)  (-3.37) (-1.96) 
Current Account Avg.  -1.320    -3.321       
  (-0.77)   (-0.78)    
Reserves 1.689***  1.891*** 1.423** 1.710*** 1.488***  1.132 
  (3.02)  (3.52)  (3.63) (4.61)  (3.84)  (3.56) 
Reserves Avg.  1.758***  1.788*** 1.475  1.254    
  (3.85)  (4.03)  (1.60)  (1.43)    
Def 1  -1.667***  -1.671*** -1.998***  -2.075*** -2.109***  -2.244 
  (-6.19)  (-6.72)  (-6.87)  (-8.11)  (-6.77)  (-7.71) 
Def 2  0.065***  0.089*** -0.015   -0.049  
  (2.67)  (3.88)  (-0.32)    (-0.76)   
EU (2)  1.220***  1.273*** 1.598***  1.650*** 1.704***  1.376 
  (6.97)  (7.22)  (6.63)  (6.69)  (6.84)  (6.51) 
IND 2.176***  2.653*** 2.289***  3.157***    
  (6.08)  (7.57)  (2.89)  (4.61)     
LAC -1.072***  -1.282*** -0.903*     
  (-5.44)  (-6.39)  (-1.93)     
R
2  0.950 0.948 0.945 0.940 0.984 0.980 
Countries  66 66 66 66 66 78 
Observations  551 557 551 557 551 699 
Hausman Test
$      21.93 (0.06)  14.30  (0.160)    
Notes: White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, ***  - statistically significant at 
the 10, 5, and 1 per cent. 
$ The null is that RE estimation is consistent and therefore preferable to fixed effects. The test statistic is to be 
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Table 5 – Estimations for S&P 
  Pooled OLS  Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 4.521***  3.749*** 4.347 7.421***  10.301***  10.278*** 
  (3.64)  (3.78)  (1.25) (15.11)  (136.51)  (240.18) 
GDP per capita  1.339***  1.430*** 1.411*** 1.403*** 1.452*** 1.918*** 
  (4.65)  (5.32)  (7.12) (7.67) (7.14)  (11.53) 
GDP per capita Avg.  0.461***  0.530*** 0.450       
  (2.90)  (4.01)  (1.05)     
GDP growth  5.715*  7.568*** 8.125*** 8.256*** 8.221*** 6.896*** 
  (1.95)  (2.83)  (3.50) (3.72) (3.37)  (3.02) 
GDP growth  Avg.  -5.358   -1.907      
  (-1.45)    (-0.20)     
Unemployment -0.008   0.055**  0.056***  0.062***  0.053*** 
  (-0.32)    (2.53) (2.73) (2.63) (2.63) 
Unemployment Avg.  -0.024*  -0.022* -0.018       
  (-1.90)  (-1.81)  (-0.45)     
Inflation -0.586**  -0.597** -0.235***  -0.229***  -0.219*** -0.235*** 
  (-2.39)  (-2.40)  (-6.17) (-6.13) (-5.33)  (-6.07) 
Inflation Avg.  -0.732***  -0.716*** -0.427*** -0.353**     
  (-2.83)  (-2.79)  (-2.65) (-2.44)    
Gov Debt  -0.026***  -0.024*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.030*** 
  (-4.78)  (-4.67)  (-6.61) (-7.22) (-5.92)  (-6.62) 
Gov Debt Avg.  -0.011***  -0.009*** -0.010 -0.012**     
  (-3.56)  (-3.24)  (-1.34) (-1.97)    
Gov Balance  5.892*  6.280** 4.387** 4.411** 4.430** 3.948* 
  (1.81)  (2.05)  (1.97) (2.01) (2.01)  (1.85) 
Gov Balance Avg.  7.026**  6.639** 5.144       
  (2.19)  (2.12)  (0.59)     
Gov Effectiveness  0.385   0.370**  0.362**  0.371**  0.717*** 
  (1.30)    (2.36) (2.47) (2.33)  (4.40) 
Gov Effectiveness Avg.  2.287***  2.244*** 2.370*** 2.758***     
  (12.82)  (14.26)  (4.91) (7.75)     
External Debt  -0.004*  -0.004* -0.003* -0.003 -0.003*   
  (-1.81)  (-1.74)  (-1.68) (-1.51) (-1.65)   
External Debt Avg.  -0.007***  -0.007*** -0.006* -0.007**     
  (-5.76)  (-5.72)  (-1.81) (-2.18)     
Current Account  -6.338***  -6.183*** -3.700** -3.586**  -3.476*   
  (-2.85)  (-2.93)  (-2.18) (-2.18) (-1.96)   
Current Account Avg.  -0.439   0.123      
  (-0.26)    (0.03)     
Reserves 0.564   0.064  0.048  
  (1.16)    (0.19)  (0.13)   
Reserves Avg.  2.170***  2.117*** 1.909** 1.988**     
  (5.31)  (5.49)  (2.06) (2.28)     
Def 1  -1.032***  -1.131*** -1.307*** -1.337*** -1.353*** -1.422*** 
  (-3.62)  (-5.84)  (-5.23) (-6.74) (-5.48)  (-6.58) 
Def 2  -0.010   -0.018  -0.025  
  (-0.31)    (-0.33)  (-0.34)   
EU (2)  1.068***  1.008*** 0.415** 0.418**  0.291   
  (6.07)  (6.02)  (2.41) (2.48) (1.55)   
IND 2.446***  2.387*** 2.831*** 3.438***     
  (8.24)  (8.77)  (3.03) (4.69)    
LAC -0.677***  -0.669*** -0.459     
  (-3.82)  (-4.06)  (-0.94)       
R
2  0.951 0.950 0.948 0.946 0.987 0.985 
Countries  65 65 65 65 65 74 
Observations  564 568 564 565 564 657 
Hausman Test 
$      16.77 (0.210)  10.73 (0.467)     
Notes: White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically 
significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent 
$ The null is that RE estimation is consistent and therefore preferable to fixed effects. The test 
statistic is to be compared to a Qui-Square with 13 and 11 degrees of freedom respectively (the number of time-varying regressors).  
The p-value is in brackets.  
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Table 6 – Estimations for Fitch 
  Pooled OLS  Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 3.477***  3.238***  4.409  7.179***  10.918***  11.055*** 
  (2.97) (3.12) (1.19)  (13.16)  (100.38)  (183.16) 
GDP  per  capita  1.670*** 1.752*** 1.697*** 1.667*** 1.743*** 1.820*** 
  (5.54) (6.13) (8.83) (9.51) (9.31)  (10.87) 
GDP per capita Avg.  0.562***  0.604***  0.375       
  (3.93) (4.64) (0.87)      
GDP growth  3.468    3.385  4.110*  3.277   
  (1.10)  (1.39)  (1.74)  (1.36)  
GDP growth  Avg.  0.659    3.220     
  (0.14)  (0.26)      
Unemployment -0.024    0.017    0.019   
  (-0.74)  (0.61)  (0.64)  
Unemployment Avg.  0.013    0.027     
  (0.76)  (0.50)      
Inflation -0.424***  -0.421***  -0.107    -0.088 -0.127*** 
  (-3.41) (-3.09) (-1.24)    (-0.98) (-1.61) 
Inflation Avg.  -0.478***  -0.464***  -0.150      
  (-3.38) (-3.21) (-0.66)       
Gov  Debt  -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.027*** -0.020*** -0.023*** 
  (-3.75) (-5.18) (-3.82) (-7.30) (-3.19) (-5.51) 
Gov Debt Avg.  -0.007**  -0.006*  -0.007     
  (-2.15) (-1.92) (-0.69)      
Gov Balance  0.310    4.371    4.872 4.381* 
  (0.08)  (1.37)    (1.53) (1.78) 
Gov Balance Avg.  9.084***  8.223***  5.220       
  (2.94) (2.86) (0.69)     
Gov  Effectiveness  0.715** 0.869*** 0.787*** 0.887*** 0.807*** 0.953*** 
  (2.44) (3.22) (4.54) (5.34) (4.69) (5.96) 
Gov Effectiveness Avg.  1.966***  1.960***  2.155***  2.741***     
  (12.33) (12.55)  (4.23)  (7.47)    
External  Debt  -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
  (-3.17) (-2.83) (-2.97) (-2.76) (-2.83) (-3.06) 
External Debt Avg.  -0.010***  -0.010***  -0.010**  -0.011***     
  (-7.12) (-7.12) (-2.53) (-3.34)    
Current Account  -3.591    -3.137    -3.176   
  (-1.44)  (-1.16)  (-1.10)  
Current Account Avg.  0.545    2.955     
  (0.32)  (0.63)      
Reserves  0.804  -0.100  -0.197  
  (1.34)  (-0.23)    (-0.45)   
Reserves  Avg.  2.854*** 2.886*** 3.090*** 2.987***     
  (6.74) (6.80) (3.59) (3.78)    
Def  1  -1.243*** -1.257*** -1.523*** -1.331*** -1.501*** -1.329*** 
  (-4.26) (-6.32) (-4.13) (-4.60) (-3.92) (-3.92) 
Def 2  -0.011   0.075  0.093  
  (-0.31)    (1.15)  (1.08)   
EU 1.063***  1.029***  0.507**  0.554**  0.305   
  (5.57) (5.64) (2.03) (2.40) (1.14)   
IND  2.246*** 2.119*** 2.781*** 2.634***    
  (5.90) (6.19) (2.61) (3.55)     
LAC -0.627***  -0.738***  -0.718      
  (-3.41) (-4.19) (-1.29)      
R
2  0.950 0.950 0.947 0.944 0.987 0.987 
Countries  58  58  58  58  58  58 
Observations  481  481  480  481  480  481 
Hausman Test 
$     12.68 (0.473) 3.68  (0.816)     
Notes: White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically 
significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent. 
$ The null is that RE estimation is consistent and therefore preferable to fixed effects. The test 
statistic is to be compared to a Qui-Square with 13 and 7 degrees of freedom respectively (the number of time-varying regressors).  
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Table 7 – Estimations for Moody’s: two sub-periods 














Constant  6.593***  -0.434  8.299***  8.222*** 10.434*** 9.968*** 
  (3.89) (-0.21)  (11.80)  (10.16)  (165.01)  (28.21) 
GDP per capita  1.640**  0.846**  1.667***  1.074***  1.709***  1.306*** 
  (2.44) (2.07) (2.75) (4.43) (2.75) (6.17) 
GDP per capita Avg.  0.288  1.276***         
  (1.29)  (4.60)      
GDP growth  2.989  13.248**  4.222  9.358*  3.731  4.752 
  (0.64) (2.51) (0.98) (1.83) (0.89) (1.18) 
GDP growth  Avg.           
           
Unemployment  -0.090***  -0.097**      
  (-2.55)  (-2.23)      
Unemployment Avg.  -0.050***  -0.043**  -0.067  -0.067     
  (-2.74) (-2.14) (-1.54) (-1.40)     
Inflation  -0.340***  -4.834***  -0.049 0.205 0.055 0.197 
  (-2.78)  (-2.82)  (-0.53) (0.21) (0.79) (0.21) 
Inflation Avg.  -0.513***  -5.240***  -0.269  -0.031     
  (-4.04) (-3.03) (-1.30) (-0.03)     
Gov  Debt  -0.030***  -0.019**  -0.025*** -0.018 -0.022*** -0.011 
  (-2.76) (-2.51) (-2.68) (-1.60) (-2.74) (-1.05) 
Gov Debt Avg.  -0.018***  -0.021***  -0.014**  -0.014*     
  (-3.88) (-4.29) (-1.93) (-1.90)    
Gov  Balance      7.643** 3.110 7.415** 2.169 
      (1.91) (0.71) (2.00) (0.64) 
Gov Balance Avg.  6.351  0.271         
  (1.39) (0.05)      
Gov Effectiveness        0.184  0.455 
       (0.70) (1.37) 
Gov Effectiveness Avg.  1.831***  1.198***  2.313***  2.629***     
  (7.00) (4.35) (5.45) (6.25)    
External Debt  -0.014***  -0.006**  -0.007**  0.000     
  (-7.38) (-2.51) (-2.40) (-0.02)    
External Debt Avg.  -0.008***  -0.004**  -0.005**  -0.002     
  (-6.16) (-2.12) (-2.48) (-0.60)    
Current  Account  -9.369*** -4.944 -7.767*** -2.553  -5.338**  0.929 
  (-3.17) (-1.50) (-2.68) (-0.85) (-2.06) (0.40) 
Current Account Avg.           
         
Reserves  0.988  1.368**  0.065 2.462*** -0.549 1.669*** 
  (0.91) (2.11) (-0.08) (3.76) (-0.87) (2.72) 
Reserves Avg.  1.660**  1.831***  0.845  0.773     
  (2.32) (3.30) (0.79) (0.70)     
Def  1  -0.783** -2.303*** -1.764*** -2.281*** -2.088*** -2.171*** 
  (-2.22) (-6.21) (-5.07) (-3.93) (-5.00) (-2.59) 
Def  2  0.046  0.158***      
  (1.34)  (4.93)      
EU  (2)  1.381*** 1.095*** 1.099*** 1.803***    1.392*** 
  (4.98) (4.81) (2.64) (7.69)    (3.70) 
IND  3.411*** 1.987*** 3.787*** 3.157***     
  (6.74) (3.64) (4.43) (3.93)    
LAC  -1.057***  -1.614***      
  (-3.97) (-5.08)        
R
2  0.949 0.957 0.941 0.944 0.988 0.989 
Countries  64 65 64 65 75 77 
Observations  280 277 280 277 324 375 
Hausman Test 
$     12.86  (0.169)  14.31 (0.112) 
#   
Notes: White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically 
significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent. 
$ The null is that RE estimation is consistent and therefore preferable to fixed effects. The test 
statistic is to be compared to a Qui-Square with 9 degrees of freedom. The p-value is in brackets. 
# The Hausman test was done 
excluding External Debt, as it was highly non-significant and seemed correlated with the errors in this particular sample. 
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Table 8 – Estimations for S&P: two sub-periods 














Constant 3.744***  1.648  7.496***  8.006***  10.519***  10.079*** 
  (2.41) (1.12)  (13.57)  (15.63)  (225.94)  (21.00) 
GDP per capita  3.159***  0.629***  2.059***  0.876***  2.063***  1.566*** 
  (4.86) (1.95) (3.44) (4.17)  (3.35) (8.05) 
GDP per capita Avg.  0.562***  0.896***         
  (2.73) (4.54)         
GDP growth  4.236  6.115  5.864**  4.559  7.955**  2.715 
  (1.06) (1.50) (1.88) (1.17)  (2.25) (0.61) 
GDP growth  Avg.           
           
Unemployment     0.109***  -0.003  0.080**  -0.047 
     (2.89)  (-0.06)  (1.85)  (-0.85) 
Unemployment Avg.  -0.036***  0.006         
  (-2.16) (0.40)         
Inflation -0.457***  -6.513***  -0.129***  -1.024  -0.156***  -0.219 
  (-2.86) (-4.33) (-2.81) (-0.81)  (-3.15) (-0.18) 
Inflation Avg.  -0.617***  -6.692***  -0.407*  -1.012     
  (-3.49) (-4.41) (-1.84) (-0.79)     
Gov Debt  -0.029***  -0.024***  -0.041***  -0.020*  -0.038***  -0.015 
  (-2.71) (-3.35) (-4.53) (-1.91)  (-3.47) (-1.07) 
Gov Debt Avg.  -0.008*  -0.018***  -0.014**  -0.013**     
  (-1.76) (-4.84) (-2.16) (-2.24)    
Gov Balance  5.140  6.695  3.849  8.296**  3.144  7.047* 
  (1.17) (1.63) (1.23) (2.18)  (0.82) (1.88) 
Gov Balance Avg.  9.078**  -3.677         
  (2.20) (-0.83)       
Gov Effectiveness     0.359*  -0.074  0.493**  0.572* 
     (1.71) (-0.29) (2.41) (1.80) 
Gov Effectiveness Avg.  2.098***  1.918***  2.433***  2.922***     
  (9.34) (8.44) (6.23) (8.48)    
External Debt  0.003  -0.008**  0.002  -0.008**     
  (0.81) (-2.46) (0.79) (-2.13)    
External Debt Avg.  -0.007***  -0.007***  -0.006**  -0.010**     
  (-4.16) (-3.90) (-2.03) (-2.44)    
Current Account  -7.098**  -0.304  -5.781**  -0.867     
  (-2.30) (-0.09) (-2.37) (-0.31)     
Current Account Avg.           
          
Reserves            
         
Reserves Avg.  1.896***  1.397***  1.675  1.618**     
  (3.26) (2.87) (1.51) (1.97)     
Def 1  -0.845***  -1.256**  -1.504***  -1.169**  -1.588  -0.941 
  (-2.60) (-5.40) (-4.71) (-2.37)  (-4.65) (-1.06) 
Def 2             
         
EU (2)  1.001***  0.960***  0.816  0.663***     
  (3.50) (4.67) (1.60) (3.45)     
IND 2.560***  1.789***  3.901***  2.513***     
  (6.15) (4.92) (4.47) (3.53)    
LAC -0.882  -0.674***         
  (-3.98) (-2.82)       
R
2 0.944  0.967  0.939  0.959  0.990  0.991 
Countries 64  65  63  65  67  74 
Observations 290  278  288  277  308  349 
Hausman Test 
$      7.84 (0.644)  16.86  (0.112)     
Notes: White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically 
significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent. 
$  The null is that RE estimation is consistent and therefore preferable to fixed effects. The test 
statistic is to be compared to a Qui-Square with 10 and 11 degrees of freedom respectively (the variable EU (2) is time invariant in 
the second sample) .  The p-value is in brackets. 
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Table 9 – Estimations for Fitch: two sub-periods 














Constant 4.953***  1.732  7.160***  7.783***  11.149***  10.637*** 
  (2.96) (1.15)  (12.04)  (14.13)  (144.80)  (17.37) 
GDP per capita  2.201***  1.030***  1.881***  1.197***  2.014***  1.354*** 
  (2.92) (3.02) (3.61) (6.00)  (4.00) (5.92) 
GDP per capita Avg.  0.403*  0.960***         
  (1.93) (4.94)         
GDP growth      -2.392  3.377     
     (-0.79)  (0.88)    
GDP growth  Avg.           
           
Unemployment            
         
Unemployment Avg.             
         
Inflation -0.233**  -7.223***      -0.098  -1.086 
  (-2.12) (-5.06)      (-1.01) (-0.73) 
Inflation Avg.  -0.364***  -7.316***         
  (-3.20) (-4.97)         
Gov Debt  -0.046***  -0.027***  -0.039***  -0.021*  -0.036***  -0.015 
  (-4.19) (-3.99) (-5.81) (-1.85)  (-4.09) (-0.78) 
Gov Debt Avg.  -0.008*  -0.010**         
  (-1.67) (-2.24)        
Gov Balance       0.852  6.226* 
       (0.22)  (1.84) 
Gov Balance Avg.  12.422***  0.503         
  (3.26) (0.12)       
Gov Effectiveness  1.490***  -0.907**  0.714***  0.298  0.545**  0.294 
  (3.60) (-2.09) (3.26)  (1.04)  (2.15) (1.15) 
Gov Effectiveness Avg.  1.958***  1.461***  2.628***  2.771***     
  (8.59) (6.37) (6.28) (8.20)    
External Debt  -0.001  -0.008***  -0.001  -0.008**  -0.001  -0.008* 
  (-0.28) (-2.76) (-0.23) (-2.26)  (-0.22) (-1.78) 
External Debt Avg.  -0.008***  -0.012***  -0.010***  -0.014***     
  (-4.34) (-5.35) (-2.68) (-3.51)    
Current Account             
         
Current Account Avg.           
          
Reserves            
         
Reserves Avg.  2.313***  2.225***  2.557**  2.696***     
  (3.42) (4.16) (2.40) (3.45)     
Def 1  -0.717**  -1.409**  -1.440***  -1.338**  -1.848**  -0.970 
  (-2.22) (-5.32) (-3.02) (-2.36)  (-2.43) (-0.97) 
Def 2             
         
EU 0.843***  0.959***  0.841*  0.579**     
  (2.92) (4.45) (1.67) (2.34)     
IND 2.953***  1.359***  2.883***  2.146***     
  (5.48) (2.89) (2.96) (3.39)    
LAC -1.017***  -0.917***         
  (-3.84) (-4.17)       
R
2 0.943  0.969  0.932  0.957  0.990  0.993 
Countries 54  58  54  58  54  58 
Observations 235  246  235  246  235  246 
Hausman Test 
$      6.95 (0.325)  11.25  (0.128)     
Notes: White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically 
significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent. 
$  The null is that RE estimation is consistent and therefore preferable to fixed effects. The test 
statistic is to be compared to a Qui-Square with 8 and 7 degrees of freedom respectively (the variable EU (2) is time invariant in the 
second sample).  The p-value is in brackets. 
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Table 10 – Estimations for Moody’s: high and low rated countries 
  Pooled OLS  Random Effects  Fixed Effects 












Constant  8.496*** 8.526*** 9.606*** 8.298***  14.243***  6.303*** 
  (6.17) (6.13) (9.90)  (14.06)  (87.56)  (60.59) 
GDP per capita  0.863***  1.132**  1192***  1.591***  1.197***  1.684*** 
  (3.11) (2.09) (6.64) (3.07) (6.73) (4.41) 
GDP per capita Avg.  0.274  -0.021         
  (1.71)  (-0.12)      
GDP  growth  1.210 6.393 1.747 6.927*  1.600 4.976 
  (0.24) (1.63) (0.48) (1.74) (0.44) (1.50) 
GDP growth  Avg.           
          
Unemployment  -0.139***  -0.080**      
  (-3.71)  (-2.37)      
Unemployment  Avg.  -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 -0.059     
  (-0.20) (-0.36) (-0.08) (-1.46)     
Inflation  -6.363* -0.405***  -4.171* -0.174** -3.994* -0.138** 
  (-1.79) (-3.43) (-1.75) (-2.26) (-1.69) (-2.39) 
Inflation Avg.  -6.272*  -0.547***  -4.676*  -0.333**     
  (-1.77) (-4.29) (-1.81) (-2.28)     
Gov  Debt  -0.007  -0.020** -0.018*** -0.018** -0.020*** -0.018*** 
  (-0.93) (-2.54) (-3.04) (-2.06) (-3.53) (-2.97) 
Gov Debt Avg.  -0.002  -0.028**  -0.005  -0.019***     
  (-0.70) (-6.73) (-0.80) (-3.38)    
Gov  Balance      6.955*** 2.931 5.843*** 3.009 
     (2.90) (0.59) (3.20) (0.95) 
Gov Balance Avg.  12.504***  5.168         
  (4.48) (0.95)      
Gov Effectiveness          0.214  0.591* 
         (1.27) (1.66) 
Gov Effectiveness Avg.  1.490***  2.132***  2.436***  2.359***     
  (7.86) (9.64) (5.15) (6.98)    
External Debt    -0.010***    -0.005*     
   (-5.47)  (-1.96)   
External Debt Avg.    -0.006***    -0.004**     
   (-5.06)  (-2.33)   
Current  Account  1.186 -7.238*** -2.922 -7.595*** -2.386  -3.367** 
  (0.51) (-2.93) (-1.59) (-2.95) (-1.33) (-1.98) 
Current Account Avg.           
        
Reserves  2.130*** 1.470** 1.112** 2.269***  1.013*** 1.664*** 
  (3.42) (2.27) (2.48) (4.04) (2.50) (3.61) 
Reserves Avg.  0.139  1.967***  1.082  0.607     
  (0.20) (3.61) (0.84) (0.64)     
Def  1   -1.514***  -1.956***  -2.192*** 
   (-5.68)  (-7.37)  (-7.30) 
Def  2    0.092***      
   (3.67)      
EU  (2)  0.611*** 2.803*** 0.591** 2.272*** 0.601*** 2.245*** 
  (3.83) (5.64) (2.28) (6.24) (2.27)  (13.65) 
IND  2.194***    1.821     
  (9.49)  (2.86)    
LAC    -0.755***      
   (-3.24)      
R
2  0.815 0.832 0.785 0.795 0.955 0.923 
Countries  33 42 39 42 41 49 
Observations  324 291 324 291 336 363 
Hausman Test 
$     4.89(8)  (0.768) 20.68  (0.023)*   
Notes: White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically 
significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent. 
$  The null is that RE estimation is consistent and therefore preferable to fixed effects. The test 
statistic is to be compared to a Qui-Square with 8 and 10 degrees of freedom respectively (the variables on External debt were 
removed from the estimation above BBB+ because there where few observation points). The p-value is in brackets. 
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Table 11 – Estimations for S&P: high and low rated countries 
  Pooled OLS  Random Effects  Fixed Effects 












Constant  4.124**  9.598*** 10.338*** 7.373*** 14.748*** 6.020*** 
  (2.07)  (8.16)  (12.48)  (19.25) (225.90) (81.45) 
GDP per capita  0.210  1.886***  0.290*  1.998***  0.276**  2.269*** 
  (0.62) (5.41) (1.94) (6.42) (1.98) (8.60) 
GDP per capita Avg.  0.829***  -0.281*         
  (3.83)  (-1.73)      
GDP growth  -1.010  9.169***  -0.328  6.230*  0.167  3.759 
  (-0.22) (2.87) (-0.16) (1.90) (0.09) (1.08) 
GDP growth  Avg.           
          
Unemployment      -0.084*** 0.088*** -0.099*** 0.095*** 
      (-3.70) (3.71) (-4.65) (3.96) 
Unemployment  Avg.  -0.026  0.025      
  (-1.18) (1.64)         
Inflation -11.197***  -0.468***  -3.670**  -0.234***  -3.221  -0.216*** 
  (-2.98) (-3.41) (-1.98) (-5.66) (-1.55) (-5.65) 
Inflation Avg.  -10.477***  -0.521***  -3.495*  -0.356***     
  (-2.79) (-3.51) (-1.85) (-3.08)     
Gov  Debt  -0.017**  -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.032*** 
  (-2.27) (-4.06) (-7.63) (-4.71) (-7.67) (-4.90) 
Gov Debt Avg.  0.001  -0.022***  -0.002  -0.020***     
  (0.25) (-6.57) (-0.23) (-3.81)    
Gov Balance  0.725  4.989  -2.096  4.129  -3.123*  5.579* 
  (0.21) (1.31) (-1.18) (1.26) (-1.94) (1.85) 
Gov Balance Avg.  13.582***  10.104***         
  (5.14) (2.22)      
Gov Effectiveness      0.363**  0.477**  0.379***  0.514** 
     (2.51) (2.04) (2.52) (2.24) 
Gov Effectiveness Avg.  1.119***  2.790***  1.894***  2.732***     
  (5.84) (13.84) (4.04)  (8.77)    
External  Debt   -0.002  -0.002    
   (-1.18)    (-0.77)    
External Debt Avg.    -0.006***    -0.006**     
   (-4.39)    (-2.12)    
Current Account  0.912  -6.384***  -0.980  0.173     
  (0.37) (-2.94) (-0.58) (0.10)     
Current Account Avg.           
Reserves        
        
Reserves Avg.  -0.520  2.676***  -0.311  2.293**     
  (-0.92) (5.91) (-0.25) (2.43)     
Def  1   -0.842***  -1.390***  -1.513*** 
   (-4.16)    (-6.68)  (-6.87) 
Def  2        
        
EU (2)  0.556***  0.778***  0.005  0.256     
  (3.43) (3.28) (0.03) (1.15)    
IND 1.869***  1.111**  2.475***  0.445     
  (7.46) (2.20) (3.81) (0.59)    
LAC    -0.428*      
    (-1.91)      
R
2  0.813 0.838 0.745 0.814 0.975 0.934 
Countries  42 40 42 40 42 42 
Observations  330 297 327 297 327 330 
Hausman Test 
$      12.97  (0.164) 16.29 (0.131)     
Notes: White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically 
significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent. 
$  The null is that RE estimation is consistent and therefore preferable to fixed effects. The test 
statistic is to be compared to a Qui-Square with 9 and 11 degrees of freedom respectively (the variables on External debt were 
removed from the estimation above BBB+ because there where few observation points) . The p-value is in brackets. 
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Table 12 – Estimations for Fitch: high and low rated countries 
  Pooled OLS  Random Effects  Fixed Effects 












Constant  5.438***  5.201*** 10.299*** 6.941***  14.644*** 6.555*** 
  (3.38) (3.61) (9.49)  (16.60)  (170.63)  (59.37) 
GDP per capita  0.740**  2.488***  1.101***  2.350***  1.159***  2.416*** 
  (2.16) (5.96) (6.59) (6.85)  (7.40)  (7.35) 
GDP per capita Avg.  0.823***  0.270         
  (4.44) (1.46)        
GDP  growth     3.170  0.531    
    (1.38)  (0.16)     
GDP growth  Avg.            
           
Unemployment         
            
Unemployment  Avg.         
           
Inflation -16.326***  -0.364***      -4.069*  -0.137 
  (-4.88) (-4.18)      (-1.72)  (-1.49) 
Inflation Avg.  -17.617***  -0.338***         
  (-5.36) (-3.39)         
Gov  Debt  -0.003  -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.025***  -0.018*** -0.024*** 
  (-0.50) (-3.80) (-7.04) (-3.88)  (-5.51)  (-3.27) 
Gov Debt Avg.  -0.007***  0.000         
  (-2.65) (-0.05)        
Gov Balance          4.214**  2.290 
       (2.25)  (0.56) 
Gov Balance Avg.  12.403***  10.113**         
  (5.04) (2.32)       
Gov  Effectiveness  -0.029  0.875** 0.572*** 0.913***  0.593*** 0.818*** 
  (-0.08) (2.31) (3.27) (3.38) (3.35)  (2.99) 
Gov Effectiveness Avg.  0.839***  2.103***  1.447  2.507***     
  (4.50) (7.65) (1.62) (6.76)    
External Debt    -0.002    -0.004**    -0.005** 
   (-1.07)  (-2.25)    (-2.32) 
External Debt Avg.    -0.011***    -0.013***     
   (-6.62)  (-4.27)    
Current  Account         
         
Current Account Avg.             
         
Reserves         
         
Reserves Avg.  -0.928  4.042***  0.122  4.039***     
  (-1.53) (6.27) (0.07) (3.64)    
Def  1   -1.159***  -1.236***   -1.325*** 
   (-5.75)  (-4.52)   (-4.28) 
Def  2         
         
EU 0.525***  -0.241  0.433*  -0.569     
 (3.32)  (-0.46) (1.71) (-1.30)    
IND 1.473***    2.552**       
  (5.55)  (2.06)     
LAC   -0.649***         
   (-3.32)       
R
2  0.832 0.830 0.669 0.812  0.973 0.924 
Countries  38 33 39 33  38 33 
Observations  296 229 301 229  296 229 
Hausman Test 
$      5.91 (0.315)  2.42 (0.933)     
Notes: White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at 
the 10, 5, and 1 per cent. 
$ The null is that RE estimation is consistent and therefore preferable to fixed effects. The test statistic is to be 
compared to a Qui-Square with 5 and 7 degrees of freedom respectively (the variables on External debt were removed from the estimation 
above BBB+ because there where few observation points). The p-value is in brackets. 
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Table 13 – Ordered Probit (robust standard errors) 
  Moody’s S&P  Fitch 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
GDP per capita  1.940***  1.948***  1.716***  1.691***  2.051***  2.011*** 
  (4.52) (4.44) (4.00) (4.02) (5.96)  (5.47) 
GDP per capita Avg.  0.418  0.482  0.252  0.480  0.369   
  (1.41) (1.44) (0.75) (1.54) (1.28)   
GDP growth  2.977    2.613    2.367   
  (0.58)  (0.71)  (0.62)   
GDP growth  Avg.  -0.382    -8.511    -0.988   
  (-0.05)  (-1.01)  (-0.11)   
Unemployment -0.066  -0.072*  -0.020    -0.026   
  (-1.42) (-1.69) (-0.54)    (-0.49)   
Unemployment Avg.  -0.049*  -0.063**  -0.038  -0.040  0.006   
  (-1.87) (-2.26) (-1.40) (-1.50)  (0.19)   
Inflation -0.402***  -0.426***  -0.515**  -0.504**  -0.372***  -0.359** 
  (-2.57) (-2.62) (-2.40) (-2.10) (-2.68)  (-2.26) 
Inflation Avg.  -0.464***  -0.503***  -0.621***  -0.562**  -0.387**  -0.277** 
  (-3.15) (-3.56) (-2.69) (-2.48) (-2.42)  (-2.10) 
Gov Debt  -0.010  -0.016*  -0.024***  -0.022***  -0.022**  -0.024*** 
  (-1.03) (-1.64) (-2.75) (-2.57) (-2.43)  (-2.87) 
Gov Debt Avg.  -0.018***  -0.020***  -0.014**  -0.013**  -0.011  -0.010 
  (-2.96) (-3.41) (-2.19) (-2.27) (-1.46)  (-1.43) 
Gov Balance  6.727  5.833  5.617  8.089**  2.340   
  (1.44) (1.35) (1.37) (2.48) (0.53)   
Gov Balance Avg.  3.843    4.001    7.575   
  (0.54)  (0.49)  (0.94)   
Gov Effectiveness  0.293    0.220  0.389  0.681**  0.742** 
  (0.99)  (0.81)  (1.50)  (1.97)  (2.19) 
Gov Effectiveness Avg.  1.781***  1.600***  2.185***  2.054***  1.887***  2.212*** 
  (5.46) (4.62) (5.64) (5.33) (4.86)  (6.18) 
External Debt  -0.010***  -0.008***  -0.003  -0.004  -0.006**  -0.006** 
  (-3.94) (-4.31) (-1.51) (-1.57) (-2.24)  (-1.96) 
External Debt Avg.  -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.006**  -0.006***  -0.010***  -0.011*** 
  (-2.76) (-3.01) (-2.32) (-2.64) (-3.58)  (-4.37) 
Current Account  -8.477***  -8.315***  -7.094**  -5.429*  -5.051  -4.773 
  (-2.58) (-3.21) (-2.29) (-1.94) (-1.38)  (-1.58) 
Current Account Avg.  4.085    5.939    5.055  7.514* 
  (1.14)  (1.51)  (1.13)  (1.94) 
Reserves 1.879***  2.287***  0.716    0.795   
  (3.50) (3.97) (1.32)    (1.18)   
Reserves Avg.  0.833    1.449  1.655*  2.835***  2.322** 
  (0.86)  (1.41)  (1.74)  (2.61)  (2.19) 
Def 1  -1.119***  -1.048***  -0.923**  -0.882**  -1.217***  -1.219*** 
  (-3.46) (-3.67) (-2.31) (-2.38) (-3.11)  (-2.93) 
EU 1.146***  1.105***  0.914**  0.901**  1.053**  0.889* 
  (3.02) (2.63) (2.04) (2.10) (2.19)  (1.88) 
IND 1.547**  1.525**  2.088***  1.470**  1.923**  2.105** 
  (2.19) (1.99) (3.23) (2.41) (2.01)  (2.39) 
LAC -0.830**  -0.857**  -0.621*  -0.680*  -0.719**   
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Table 13 (Cont.) – Ordered Probit (robust standard errors) 
 
  Moody’s S&P  Fitch 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
Constant 3.97  3.63  5.08  2.93  4.12  6.76 
Cut1 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Cut2 1.79  1.77  1.73  1.74  2.14  2.12 
Cut3 2.66  2.63  2.65  2.69  2.87  2.85 
Cut4 3.49  3.43  3.21  3.28  3.72  3.68 
Cut5 3.99  3.89  3.92  4.00  4.27  4.23 
Cut6 4.60  4.49  4.91  4.98  5.22  5.17 
Cut7 5.47  5.39  5.72  5.78  6.30  6.17 
Cut8 6.78  6.63  6.90  6.99  7.51  7.30 
Cut9 7.50  7.35  7.80  7.89  8.32  8.06 
Cut10 8.27  8.08  8.33  8.42  9.00  8.76 
Cut11 9.04  8.81  9.61  9.69  10.50  10.30 
Cut12 9.61  9.36  10.60  10.58  11.39  11.15 
Cut13 10.18  9.90  11.18  11.07  11.45  11.19 
Cut14 10.72  10.39  11.46  11.32  12.26  11.93 
Cut15 11.50  11.12  12.22  11.99  13.24  12.89 
Cut16 12.07  11.68  13.32  13.02  13.82  13.46 
LogPseudoLik -704.56  -727.14  -743.14  -755.25  -602.85  -614.66 
Pseudo R
2 0.500  0.490  0.495  0.488  0.504  0.495 
Countries 66  66  65  65  58  58 
Observations 551  557  564  565  480  481 
Equal differences
$  12.97 (0.529)  13.21 (0.510)  32.22 (0.004) 38.33 (0.001)  139.81 (0.000)  182.87 (0.000)
Jump










Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent  
$The null is that the differences 
between categories is equal for all categories. The test statistic is to be compared to a Qui-Square with 14 degrees of freedom. 
& The null is 
that the differences between categories is equal for all categories except for the identified jump. The test statistic is to be compared to a Qui-
Square with 13 degrees of freedom. The p-value is in brackets. 
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Table 14 – Random effects ordered Probit 
 Moody’s  S&P  Fitch 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP  per  capita  3.422*** 3.349*** 3.246*** 2.686*** 4.087*** 4.160*** 
  (9.40) (9.14) (9.02) (8.12)  (12.15)  (13.12) 
GDP  per  capita  Avg.  0.478*** 0.562*** 1.117*** 0.614*** 1.132*** 0.913*** 
  (2.75) (3.84) (6.03) (3.94) (7.81) (5.45) 
GDP growth  6.464**  7.852**  5.979*  7.729***  -5.119*   
  (2.06) (2.30) (1.93) (2.60) (-1.73)   
GDP growth  Avg.  -9.387**    -8.43*    -6.083   
  (-2.04)  (-1.79)  (-1.31)  
Unemployment 0.016   0.152***  0.135***  0.012  
  (0.50)  (4.57)  (3.01)  (0.36)  
Unemployment Avg.  -0.078***  -0.085***  0.002    -0.073***  -0.033** 
  (-4.40) (-5.18) (0.10)    (-4.40) (-2.09) 
Inflation -0.199  -0.214  -0.353**  -0.418***  -0.273**  -0.245* 
  (-1.41) (-1.51) (-2.53) (-2.93) (-1.96) (-1.79) 
Inflation  Avg.  -0.623*** -0.939*** -0.532*** -0.949*** -0.713***  -0.272* 
  (-4.01) (-6.11) (-3.41) (-6.08) (-4.62) (-1.84) 
Gov  Debt  -0.03***  -0.032*** -0.085*** -0.088*** -0.043*** -0.051*** 
  (-4.61) (-4.94)  (-11.90)  (-12.41)  (-7.24) (-9.07) 
Gov Debt Avg.  -0.026***  -0.028***  -0.027***  -0.031***  0.001   
  (-6.99) (-8.80) (-8.77)  (-10.47) (0.26)   
Gov  Balance  13.898*** 10.937*** 10.187*** 11.559***  9.487***   
  (3.74) (2.77) (3.07) (3.32) (3.00)   
Gov Balance Avg.  6.757*    8.873**    22.304***  21.812*** 
  (1.84)  (2.40)  (6.18)  (5.83) 
Gov Effectiveness  0.223    0.707**  0.794**  1.761***  1.838*** 
  (0.64)  (2.08)  (2.42)  (4.86)  (5.17) 
Gov  Effectiveness  Avg.  3.679*** 3.547*** 4.606*** 3.752*** 2.722*** 3.104*** 
  (13.46) (15.44) (16.30) (15.62) (11.37) (12.28) 
External Debt  -0.004**  -0.002**  -0.002       
  (-2.29) (-2.21) (-0.79)       
External Debt Avg.  -0.004***    -0.008***  -0.014***     
  (-3.11)  (-6.40)  (-10.39)     
Current Account  -8.57***  -12.863***  -4.899**    2.772   
  (-3.62) (-5.94) (-2.04)    (1.23)   
Current Account Avg.  5.24**  3.723*  18.39***  5.769**  18.993***  26.980*** 
  (2.21) (1.73) (7.21) (2.54) (7.89)  (11.27) 
Reserves 2.246***  2.952***  0.205    -0.549   
  (4.37) (5.82) (0.42)    (-1.14)   
Reserves Avg.  0.416    3.365***  2.520***  0.876*   
  (0.88)  (6.94)  (5.57)  (1.83)  
Def  1  -3.101*** -2.936*** -1.789*** -2.077*** -2.176*** -1.266*** 
  (-12.18) (-11.95)  (-8.05)  (-9.25)  (-9.33)  (-6.03) 
EU 2.197***  2.237***  0.324    0.336   
  (9.04) (8.90) (1.55)    (1.57)   
IND  3.554*** 3.626*** 3.923*** 5.848*** 4.982*** 6.163*** 
  (7.71) (9.08) (8.18)  (11.38)  (13.24)  (15.54) 
LAC  -1.766*** -1.711*** -1.485*** -0.901*** -2.570*** -3.165*** 
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Table 14 (Cont.) – Random effects ordered Probit 
 
 Moody’s  S&P  Fitch 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant  8.13 7.00 3.22 7.63 2.46 3.71 
Cut1  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Cut2  2.00 2.06 2.19 2.16 2.35 2.38 
Cut3  3.40 3.36 4.12 4.07 3.33 3.43 
Cut4  4.94 5.01 5.34 5.34 4.64 4.82 
Cut5  5.94 6.14 7.11 7.19 5.77 5.93 
Cut6  7.09 7.35 9.15 9.32 7.51 7.54 
Cut7  8.65 8.92  10.75  10.80  9.13 9.02 
Cut8  10.72 10.75 13.11 12.92 10.80 10.81 
Cut9  11.76 11.82 14.59 14.30 11.82 12.02 
Cut10  12.97 13.13 15.46 14.99 12.92 13.10 
Cut11  14.25 14.49 17.49 16.59 15.30 15.42 
Cut12  15.50 15.72 18.96 18.00 16.99 17.52 
Cut13  17.62 17.50 21.51 19.99 17.63 18.42 
Cut14  19.11 18.86 22.72 21.07 19.85 20.87 
Cut15  20.60 20.26 24.54 23.00 22.11 23.07 
Cut16  21.64 21.26 27.07 25.69 24.06 25.04 
LogLik  -566.33 -578.24 -514.45 -531.22 -537.09 -533.09 
Observations  551 557 564 565 553 564 
Equal differences 
$  29.26  (0.009)  19.91 (0.133)  52.21 (0.000)  59.68  (0.000)  68.57 (0.000)  70.23 (0.000) 
Jump
&  [7-8] [7-8]    [9-10]  [12-13]   
Different Slopes
#    
[2-3 ,5-6, 7-8, 
10-11,12-13, 
14-15, 15-16] 









*  18.22 (0.149)  12.22 (0.510)  19.23  (0.116) 
 






Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent  
$The null is that the differences 
between categories is equal for all categories. The test statistic is to be compared to a Qui-Square with 14 degrees of freedom. 
& Identifies 
two cut points that have a irregular difference. 
# Identifies a cluster of categories that seem to have a higher slope (increase difficulty in 
transition between adjacent notches).
 *The null is that, excluding the jump point, within the two identified clusters the slopes are equal. The 
test statistic is to be compared to a Qui-Square with either 13 degrees of freedom (if only a jump or different slopes was identified) or 12 
degrees of freedom (if both where identified). The p-value is in brackets. 
 
 





























Table 15 – Summary of prediction errors 
 





Table 16 – Upgrades and downgrades prediction 
 
Upgrades correctly 
predicted at time 
Downgrades correctly 
predicted at time 
  










OLS  60 95  23  20  34  55  20  10 
RE with εi  60 87  28  17  34  51  16  12 
RE without  εi  60 89  23  16  34  51  17 8 
Ordered Probit  60 127  31  25  34  72  20  8 
Moody's 
RE Ordered Probit  60 101  23  23  34  65  18  8 
OLS  79 79  32  17  41  50  16  15 
RE with εi  79 79  31  14  41  52  18  12 
RE without  εi  79 90  34  15  41  61  19  14 
Ordered Probit  79 102  38  14  41  64  20 13 
S&P 
RE Ordered Probit  79 90  31  15  41  68  20  12 
OLS  68 74  28  19  25  35  13 3 
RE with εi  68 67  25  19  25  34  15 7 
RE without  εi  68 89  24  20  25  53  15 5 
Ordered Probit  69 115  30  24  25  71  15  5 
Fitch 
RE Ordered Probit  89 154  43  29  26  77  13  7 
 









Prediction error (notches) 
  Estimation 
Procedure  Obs. 
5 4  3  2  1  0  -1  -2 -3  -4  -5 
% Correctly 
predicted 
% Within 1 
notch * 
% Within 2 
notches ** 
OLS 557  0  5  12  42  88  209  141  58 2 0  0  37.5% 78.6%  96.6% 
RE with εi 557  0  0  1  17  78  361  91  8 1  0  0  64.8% 95.2%  99.6% 
RE without  εi 557  0  6  15  49  92  188  141  53 12 1 0  33.8% 75.6%  93.9% 
Ordered Probit  557  4  4  14  35  99  259  86  46 10 0 0  46.5% 79.7%  94.3% 
Moody’s 
RE Ordered Probit  557  0  8  23  59  106  244  71  34 11 1 0  43.8% 75.6%  92.3% 
OLS 568  0  3  15  34  104  218  147  41 6 0  0  38.4% 82.6%  95.8% 
RE with εi 565  0  0  1  6  80  392  83  2 1  0  0  69.4% 98.2%  99.6% 
RE without  εi 565  0  5  12  39  98  216  133  52 10 0 0  38.2% 79.1%  95.2% 
Ordered Probit  565  0  10  14  28  99  262  118  23 10 1 0  46.4% 84.8%  93.8% 
S&P 
RE Ordered Probit  565  1  12  13  41  115  218  130  29 6 0  0  38.6% 81.9%  94.3% 
OLS 481  1  3  6  32  87  196  113  43 0 0  0  40.7% 82.3%  97.9% 
RE with εi 481  0  1  2  4  63  339  71  1 0  0  0  70.5% 98.3%  99.4% 
RE without  εi 481  1  3  7  39  93  174  106  57 1 0  0  36.2% 77.5%  97.5% 
Ordered Probit  481  1  0  16  32  91  209  95  31 6 0  0  43.5% 82.1%  95.2% 
Fitch 
RE Ordered Probit  553  1 3  25 53  115  191  121  36 8 0  0  34.5%  77.2%  93.3% 
50
ECB 




Table 17 – Example of country analysis: variables’ contribution to expected rating changes 
 
  17a – European countries 
   Portugal  Spain  Greece Italy Ireland 
  1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 
Moody's  Aa2 (15)  Aa2 (15)  Aa2 (15)  Aaa (17)  Baa1 (10) A1 (13)  Aa3 (14)  Aa2 (15)  Aaa (17)  Aaa (17) 





Fitch  AA (15)  AA (15)  AA (15)  AAA (17)  BBB (9)  A (12)  AA- (14)  AA (15)  AAA (17)  AAA (17) 
Macro contribution  0.53  0.73 0.93 1.69 1.98 2.28 1.33 1.52 1.70 0.91 1.08 1.26 1.46 1.83 2.20 
Gov. contribution  -0.69  -0.46 -0.23 0.27  0.65 1.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.14 0.31 0.20 0.39 0.58 
External contribution  0.09  0.12 0.15 0.22 0.31 0.39 0.18 0.24 0.31 0.17 0.24 0.30 0.15 0.21 0.26 
European Union  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mood
y's 
Overall change  -0.07  0.39 0.86 2.19 2.95 3.70 1.46 1.75 2.03 1.05 1.46 1.87 1.81 2.43 3.05 
Macro contribution  0.42  0.57 0.73 0.94 1.07 1.20 0.99 1.13 1.27 0.56 0.67 0.77 0.91 1.15 1.38 
Gov. contribution  -1.06  -0.88 -0.70 0.48  0.77 1.06 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 0.07  0.21 0.34 0.83 0.98 1.14 
External contribution  0.03  0.05 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.09 0.14 
European Union  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
S&P 
Overall change  -0.61  -0.25 0.11 1.49 1.98 2.47 0.91 1.14 1.36 0.69 0.98 1.26 1.78 2.22 2.66 
Macro contribution  0.90  0.99 1.08 1.78 2.01 2.25 1.43 1.56 1.69 1.06 1.18 1.30 1.92 2.14 2.35 
Gov. contribution  -1.26  -1.05 -0.85 -0.46 -0.13 0.19 -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.45 -0.29 -0.14 0.15  0.31 0.47 
External contribution  -0.06  -0.03 -0.01 -0.16 -0.09 -0.02 -0.13 -0.07 -0.01 -0.12 -0.07 -0.01 -0.11 -0.06 -0.01








  17b – European countries 
    Czech Republic  Hungary  Poland Slovakia  Slovenia 
  1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 
Moody's  Baa1 (10)  A1 (13)  Baa3 (10) A1 (13)  Baa3 (10) A2 (12)  Ba1 (7)  A2 (12)  A3 (11)  Aa3 (14) 





Fitch  BBB+ (10)  A (12)  BBB (9)  BBB+ (10) BBB+ (10) BBB+ (10) BB+(7)  A (12)  A- (11)  AA- (14) 
Macro contribution  1.43  1.76 2.08 2.08 2.36 2.65 0.59 0.90 1.21 1.30 1.57 1.84 1.07 1.22 1.38 
Gov. contribution  -0.75  -0.59 -0.43 -0.39 -0.29 -0.19 -0.61 -0.42 -0.23 -0.32 -0.11 0.10 -0.23 -0.10 0.02 
External contribution  -0.08  -0.05 -0.01 0.00  0.09 0.17 -0.34 -0.23 -0.13 -0.04 0.26 0.56 0.13 0.17 0.22 
European Union  1.42  1.60 1.77 1.42 1.60 1.77 1.42 1.60 1.77 1.42 1.60 1.77 1.42 1.60 1.77 
Mood
y's 
Overall change  2.03  2.72 3.41 3.11 3.76 4.41 1.06 1.85 2.63 2.37 3.32 4.28 2.39 2.89 3.39 
Macro contribution  1.24  1.46 1.68 1.48 1.69 1.89 0.86 1.03 1.19 1.23 1.39 1.55 0.76 0.87 0.99 
Gov. contribution  -1.05  -0.93 -0.80 -0.25 -0.18 -0.11 -0.63 -0.49 -0.35 -0.45 -0.28 -0.11 -0.18 -0.08 0.02 
External contribution  -0.02  0.00 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.15 -0.09 -0.01 0.07 -0.28 -0.02 0.23 0.01 0.04 0.07 
European Union  0.07  0.19 0.31 0.07 0.19 0.31 0.07 0.19 0.31 0.07 0.19 0.31 0.07 0.19 0.31 
S&P 
Overall change  0.23  0.73 1.22 1.31 1.77 2.24 0.20 0.72 1.23 0.58 1.28 1.97 0.66 1.02 1.38 
Macro contribution  1.53  1.73 1.92 2.24 2.48 2.71 0.95 1.17 1.39 1.51 1.73 1.95 1.20 1.32 1.44 
Gov. contribution  -0.80  -0.67 -0.54 -0.35 -0.27 -0.19 -0.88 -0.72 -0.55 0.20  0.38 0.57 0.13 0.24 0.35 
External contribution  0.05  0.10 0.15 -0.10  -0.02 0.05 0.11 0.24 0.38 0.27 0.73 1.19 -0.08  -0.04 -0.01




Overall change  0.86  1.37 1.89 1.88 2.40 2.93 0.26 0.92 1.58 2.06 3.06 4.07 1.33 1.73 2.14 
 
Notes: The block contributions were calculated using the changes in the variables multiplied by the short-run coefficients estimated by 
random effects ordered probit, and then aggregated. The only exception was unemployment, for which we used the long-run coefficient. The 
upper and lower bounds where calculated using plus and minus one standard deviation. 
 















  17c – Emerging economies 
   Brazil  Malaysia  Mexico  South  Africa  Thailand 
  1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998 2005 1998  2005 
Moody's  B2( 3) Ba3  (5) Baa3  (8) A3  (11) Ba2  (7) Baa1  (10) Ba1 (7) Baa1  (10) Baa3  (8) Baa1  (10) 






Fitch  B+ (4) BB-  (5) BB  (6) A-  (11) BB  (6) BBB  (9) BB+  (7) BBB+  (10) BB  (6) BBB+  (10)
Macro contribution  -0.59  -0.49 -0.39 1.00  1.19 1.37 0.95 1.17 1.39 0.79 1.03 1.27 0.91 1.19 1.47 
Gov. contribution  -0.37  -0.16 0.06 -1.06 -0.79 -0.53 0.26  0.45 0.64 0.34 0.61 0.88 -0.31  -0.14 0.04 





Overall change  -1.11  -0.47 0.17 -0.76 0.04 0.83 1.34 1.88 2.42 1.41 2.02 2.64 0.24 0.94 1.64 
Macro contribution  -0.19  -0.16 -0.13 0.77  0.91 1.05 0.71 0.88 1.05 0.86 0.99 1.13 0.70 0.92 1.13 
Gov. contribution  -1.01  -0.84 -0.67 -0.93 -0.73 -0.53 0.25  0.40 0.54 0.75 0.96 1.17 -0.68  -0.54 -0.40 
External contribution  -0.22  0.06 0.34 -0.56  -0.28 0.00 -0.06 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.08 0.17 -0.15 0.06 0.26 
S&P 
Overall change  -1.42  -0.94 -0.45 -0.71 -0.10 0.52 0.90 1.32 1.73 1.61 2.04 2.46 -0.13 0.43 0.99 
Macro contribution  -0.56  -0.49 -0.41 1.04  1.14 1.25 1.26 1.39 1.52 0.92 1.09 1.25 0.80 0.89 0.97 
Gov. contribution  -0.46  -0.28 -0.11 -0.61 -0.40 -0.18 -0.08 0.08 0.24 0.91 1.14 1.37 -0.18  -0.03 0.12 




Overall change  -0.30  0.60 1.49 0.55 1.26 1.97 1.31 1.82 2.32 1.76 2.30 2.83 1.06 1.72 2.38 
 
Notes: The block contributions were calculated using the changes in the variables multiplied by the short-run coefficients estimated by 
random effects ordered probit, and then aggregated. The only exception was unemployment, for which we used the long-run coefficient. The 
upper and lower bounds where calculated using plus and minus one standard deviation. 
 











































Figure 1 – Number of countries rated and rating categories 
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Figure 2 – Random effects ordered probit cut-off points for the three agencies 
 








































































3a – OLS 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4a – OLS 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5a – OLS 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 1 – Data sources 
 
Variable Description  Source  Codename 
Per Capita GDP  Per capita nominal GDP in US dollars (logs)  IMF (WEO)  NGDPDPC 
GDP Growth  Annual growth rate of real GDP  IMF (WEO)  NGDP_R 
Unemployment Rate  Unemployment Rate   IMF (WEO)  LUR 
Inflation  Annual growth rate of Consumer Price Index  IMF (WEO)  PCPI 
Government  Debt  Central Government Debt over GDP  Jaimovich, 
Panizza (2006)   
Government balance  General government balance as percentage of GDP IMF (WEO)  GGB, NGDP 
Government Effectiveness Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2006  WB(AGI)   
External Debt  Total debt as share of exports of goods and 
services  WB (GDF)   
Current Account  Current account balance as percentage of GDP  IMF (WEO)  BCA, NGDPD 
Reserves   Reserves to Imports ratio  IMF (WEO, IFS)  BM, .0.01.D$S.Z.F.$$$
DEF 1  Dummy: 1 if country has defaulted since 1980  S&P   
DEF 2  Years since last default  S&P   
EU  Dummy: 1 If country belongs to European Union     
IND  Dummy: 1 if Industrial Countries  WB   
LAC  Dummy: 1 if Latin America and Caribbean   WB   
Other variables used      
Investment  Gross capital formation as percentage of GDP  IMF (WEO)  NI_R, NGDP_R 
OIL balance  Oil trade balance as percentage of GDP  IMF (WEO)  TBO, NGDPD 
Government Expenditure  General government total expenditure as 
percentage of GDP  IMF (WEO)  GGEI, NGDP 
Government Interest 
Expenditure 
General government interest expenditure as 
percentage of GDP  IMF (WEO)  GGRG, NGDP 
Government Revenue  General government total revenue as percentage of 
GDP  IMF (WEO)  GGENL, NGDP 
Trade openness   Total Exports plus total Imports as percentage of 
GDP  IMF (WEO)  BM, BX NGDPD 
Exports Growth  Annual growth rate of real exports  IMF (WEO)  NX_R 
Domestic Credit Growth  Annual growth rate of Domestic credit  IMF (IFS)  .3.12.$$$.Z.F.$$$ 
Interest over Exports  Interest paid as percentage of total exports of goods 
and services  WB (GDF)   
Reserves over total debt  Reserves as percentage of total debt  WB (GDF)   
Short-term debt  Short-term debt as percentage of total debt  WB (GDF)   
      
Total debt  Total debt as share of gross national income  WB (GDF)   
Voice and Accountability  Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2004  WB(AGI)   
Political Stability  Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2005  WB(AGI)   
      
Regulatory Quality  Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2007  WB(AGI)   
Rule of Law  Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2008  WB(AGI)   
Control of Corruption  Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2009  WB(AGI)   
AGI Compound index  Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2010: sum 
of 6 categories  WB(AGI)   
Corruption Perception 
Index   
Transparent 
International   
EAP  Dummy: 1 if East Asia and Pacific  WB   
ECA  Dummy: 1 if Europe and Central Asia  WB   
MNA  Dummy: 1 if Middle East and North Africa  WB   
SAS  Dummy: 1 if South Asia  WB   
SSA  Dummy: 1 if Sub-Saharan Africa  WB   
 
Notes: WEO –World Economic Outlook; AGI – Aggregate Governance Indicators; GDF – Global Development 













Appendix 2 – Countries and years in most extensive rating sample 
 
Country Years Obs. Country  Years  Obs.  Country  Years  Obs.
Andorra  4 4  Greece  19  42  Nicaragua  9 9 
Argentina 21  45  Grenada  5  5  Nigeria  1  2 
Aruba 5  5  Guatemala  10  17  Norway  32  73 
Australia  36 79  Honduras  8  8 Oman  11 21 
Austria  32 75  Hong  Kong  21  56  Pakistan  13 26 
Azerbaijan 7  7  Hungary  15  34  Panama  10  29 
Bahamas  10  14  Iceland  18  43  Papua New Guinea  9  25 
Bahrain  11 23  India  17  32  Paraguay  11 20 
Barbados  12 20  Indonesia  15  38  Peru  10 26 
Belgium  19 51  Iran  5  5 Philippines  14 36 
Belize 8  15  Ireland  20  52  Poland  12  36 
Benin  4  7  Isle of Man  7  7  Portugal  21  53 
Bermuda  13 38  Israel  19  43  Qatar  11 19 
Bolivia 9  21  Italy  21  53  Romania  11  32 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  3 3  Jamaica  8  13  Russia  11  33 
Botswana 6  12  Japan  31  70  San  Marino  6  6 
Brazil  21 47  Jordan  12  23  Saudi  Arabia  11 18 
Bulgaria 11  29  Kazakhstan  11  33  Senegal  7  7 
Burkina  Faso  3 3  Korea  19  39  Serbia  3 5 
Cameroon 4  8  Kuwait  12  33  Singapore  18  45 
Canada  36 85  Latvia  10  27  Slovakia  13 33 
Cape Verde  4  4  Lebanon  10  30  Slovenia  11  33 
Chile  15 36  Lesotho  5  5 South  Africa  13 39 
China  19 43  Liechtenstein  11  11  Spain  19 51 
Colombia 14  41  Lithuania  11  31  Sri  Lanka  2  4 
Cook Islands  10  10  Luxembourg  18  44  Suriname  8  14 
Costa  Rica  10 29  Macao  10  10  Sweden  30 61 
Croatia  10 30  Macedonia  3  5 Switzerland  26 58 
Cuba 8  8  Madagascar  3  3  Taiwan  18  37 
Cyprus  13 27  Malawi  4  4 Thailand  18 45 
Czech Republic  14  40  Malaysia  21  48  Trinidad and Tobago  14  25 
Denmark  36 75  Mali  3  6 Tunisia  12 22 
Dominican 
Republic  10 22  Malta  13  37  Turkey  15 43 
Egypt  10 26  Mauritius  11  11  Turkmenistan  10 10 
El Salvador  11  32  Mexico  17  44  Uganda  2  2 
Ecuador 10  22  Moldova 10  19  Ukraine  9  21 
Estonia 10  25  Mongolia  8  10  United Arab Emirates  11  11 
Fiji Islands  8  8  Montenegro  3  3  United Kingdom  29  71 
Finland 30  73  Montserrat  3  3  United States of America  37  86 
France  32 60  Morocco  9  17  Uruguay  14 39 
Gambia 5  5  Mozambique  4  7  Venezuela  30  60 
Georgia 2  2  Namibia 2  2  Vietnam  5  12 
Germany 24  58  Netherlands  21  52       
Ghana 4  8  New  Zealand  37  73       
 
 
Note: For instance, for 2005 the total number of rated countries was 130 (Fitch, 98; S&P, 110; Moody's, 98). 
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Appendix 3 – A logistic transformation 
 
One alternative way to overcome the criticism of assuming that the distance between 
two notches is equal for every combination of sequential notches is to apply alternative 
transformations besides the usual linear one. For instance, one could use either a logistic 
or an exponential transformation.  
 
The idea underlying the use of a logistic transformation is that at the middle of the scale, 
ratings can rise rather quickly, as the sovereigns deliver some improvements. Both at 
the bottom and top end of the rating scale, however, the increase of an additional notch 
is slower, since the requisites of sovereign debt quality are more demanding. 
 
If one assumes that the functional form that describes the relationship between the 
creditworthiness rating, Ri, normalized to grade each of the countries on a scale of zero 
to one, with zero representing the least creditworthy countries and one representing the 
most creditworthy countries, and the set of explanatory variables, X, is the standard 











= , (A3.1) 
 
where the vector β includes the parameters of the exogenous variables. The logistic 
transformation then becomes 
 
  [] X R R L i i i
' ) 1 /( ln β = − = , (A3.2) 
 
where Li is the logit of Ri.
8 This equation is not only linear in X, but also linear in the 
parameters and can be estimated using ordinary least squares.  
 
Figure A3.1 compares the linear and the logistic transformation and in Table A3.1 we 
present the values that we used alternatively in the logistic transformation. Table A3.2 
reports the estimation results for the three rating agencies using the respective full panel 
                                                           
8Where  (2 1)/(2    ) i R i number of categories =− × . 
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data sample for the random effects specification. As in the main text we present for each 
rating agency an unrestricted and a restricted model. The overall fit seems very good 
even though slightly lower than the one obtained with the linear transformation. Again 
broadly the same core variables are also picked up as relevant determinants of the rating 
levels: GDP per capita, GDP growth, government debt, government effectiveness 
indicators, external debt, external reserves, and default history.  
 
Table A3.1 – Logistic transformation 
 
Rating AAA  AA+  AA  AA-  A+ A A-  BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB  BB-  B+ B B-  <B- 
Linear 17  16  15  14  13  12  11  10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Logistic  3.5 2.34 1.76 1.35 1.02 0.74 0.48 0.24 0  -0.2 -0.5 -0.7  -1  -1.4 -1.8 -2.3 -3.5 
 
 

































































Table A3.2 – Random Effects results, using a logistic transformation 
  Moody’s S&P  Fitch 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -1.267  -0.379**  -0.012  -2.157**  -1.050  0.027 
  (-0.74) (-2.55) (-0.01) (-2.31) (-0.46) (0.11) 
GDP per capita  0.764***  0.788***  0.585***  0.683***  0.654***  0.665*** 
  (6.39) (8.11) (5.60)  (10.31)  (7.52) (7.92) 
GDP per capita Avg.  0.172    0.183  0.246**  0.100   
  (0.84)  (0.94)  (2.06)  (0.38)  
GDP  growth  0.593  0.147  -0.781  
  (0.41)  (0.13)  (-0.65)  
GDP growth  Avg.  -1.388    -5.525    -1.368   
  (-0.25)  (-1.33)  (-0.18)  
Unemployment -0.028**  -0.024**  0.007    -0.013   
  (-2.11) (-1.99) (0.67)    (-1.08)   
Unemployment  Avg.  -0.015  -0.004  0.019  
  (-0.84)  (-0.24)  (0.80)  
Inflation -0.089***  -0.072*  -0.089***  -0.098***  -0.044   
  (-3.33) (-1.88) (-4.35) (-4.54) (-1.21)   
Inflation Avg.  -0.118    -0.113  -0.102***  -0.016   
  (-1.30)    (-1.48) (-3.47) (-0.15)   
Gov Debt  -0.008***  -0.006**  -0.020***  -0.018***  -0.013***  -0.014*** 
  (-2.94)  (-2.33)  (-8.99) (-11.29) (-4.81)  (-6.35) 
Gov Debt Avg.  -0.007***  -0.005*  -0.007**  -0.006***  -0.009**  -0.007** 
  (-2.81) (-1.92) (-2.24) (-2.93) (-2.10) (-2.18) 
Gov Balance  3.380***  3.070***  1.989**  1.576*  1.910  1.901* 
  (2.60) (3.11) (2.00) (1.76) (1.63) (1.66) 
Gov Balance Avg.  1.866    -1.946    -1.152   
  (0.57)  (-0.47)  (-0.32)  
Gov Effectiveness  0.107  0.163*  0.105  0.182***  0.262***  0.229*** 
  (0.92) (1.70) (1.32) (2.62) (2.92) (2.67) 
Gov Effectiveness Avg.  0.714***  1.030***  1.001***  0.910***  0.832***  0.841*** 
  (3.32) (8.42) (4.20) (5.16) (2.93) (4.75) 
External Debt  0.000    -0.001    -0.002**  -0.001* 
  (-0.28)  (-1.08)  (-2.12)  (-1.66) 
External Debt Avg.  0.000    -0.002    -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.12)  (-1.07)  (-1.44)  (-1.58) 
Current Account  -2.331**  -1.791**  0.195    0.054   
  (-2.49) (-2.47) (0.30)    (0.05)   
Current Account Avg.  1.943  3.980**  3.785**  4.778***  4.955**  5.275** 
  (1.09) (2.03) (2.09) (3.26) (2.26) (2.44) 
Reserves 0.798***    -0.048    -0.120   
  (3.60)  (-0.29)  (-0.66)  
Reserves Avg.  0.070  0.597***  0.183    0.753   
  (0.16) (3.10) (0.35)    (1.51)   
Def  1  -1.044*** -1.096*** -0.561*** -0.465*** -0.510*** -0.566*** 
  (-7.24) (-8.18) (-3.53) (-4.13) (-2.85) (-3.38) 
Def 2  0.051***  0.047***  0.021    0.072**  0.062*** 
  (2.12) (2.27) (0.70)    (2.15) (1.99) 
EU 0.325***  0.234***  0.060    0.109  0.103 
  (3.23) (2.92) (0.88)    (1.30) (1.41) 
IND  1.323*** 1.371*** 1.255*** 0.940*** 1.177*** 1.277*** 
  (4.42) (6.19) (3.54) (4.76) (2.73) (4.07) 
LAC -0.304*    -0.003  -0.332**  -0.318   
  (-1.72)    (-0.01) (-2.16) (-1.28)   
R
2  0.921 0.910 0.914 0.905 0.902 0.902 
Countries  66 73 65 74 58 58 
Observations  551 655 564 657 480 481 
Hausman Test
$  15.43 (0.281)  4.33 (0.959)  15.24 (0.293)  11.86 (0.065)  15.24 (0.292)  9.01 (0.342) 
Notes: White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). The t statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically 
significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent. 
$ The null is that RE estimation is consistent and therefore preferable to fixed effects. The test 
statistic is to be compared to a Qui-Square with 13, 11, 13, 6, 13, 8 degrees of freedom. The p-value is in brackets 
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